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E

CONOMIC
warfare among
theInfifty
states"interferences"
must trouble even
the
most optimistic
observer.
theory,
with
free trade should not last long because the futility of aggression
will often become apparent to the warring states. For example," if
Mississippi bars the sale of Louisiana milk because Louisiana refuses milk processed in Mississippi, the two states may come to recognize the advantages of free trade' and, in the absence of real
health concerns,3 cease hostilities. In addition, Mississippi milk
consumers may realize that despite the benefits to some in-state
producers, they face higher milk prices because of the import ban.
These resident consumers can then work through the political system to overturn the ban on Louisiana milk. In practice, however,
the history of analogous tariffs and other obstacles to international
trade4 suggests that some interstate commercial aggression will
persist, and that intervention on behalf of commerce clause principles by some neutral agency is desirable.' Moreover, even if an interference is eventually withdrawn, the harm it does while it survives may justify intervention to hasten its collapse.
There is even less room for optimism when an aggressive state
can exploit a unique advantage it enjoys because of its location,
history, or resources. Victimized states cannot retaliate as easily
against such "exploitations," and all the residents of the aggressor
state may gain by exploiting their advantage. Furthermore, if a
number of states together enjoy an exploitable resource, they can
See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
'To the extent trade involves voluntary bargains it is an economically "efficient" activity. Free trade in the commerce clause area, however, sometimes refers to uniform national

rules, in which case it may be efficient because state-imposed barriers are absent. It also
may be inefficient because citizens are offered few real choices although there are numerous
"suppliers" (i.e., states) and because jurisdictions have little reason to "compete" with one
another for citizens' approval. See W. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 11-13 (1972); Regulation,
Federalism, and Interstate Commerce 11, 96 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
1 424 U.S. at 377 (noting that the state could apply its own standards of inspection to

shipments from a nonreciprocating state instead of banning such trade).
4 C. Kindleberger & P. Lindert, International Economics 214-27 (6th ed. 1978) (suggesting that proliferation of international trade barriers despite limited net gains from such
barriers derives from "biases in lobbying power").
5This article develops themes concerning interstate economic tensions and relates these
themes to a variety of cases and issues. It does not emphasize specific constitutional doctrines and language. Thus, the term "commerce clause" refers to general considerations of
interstate economic activity, usually arising in the context of one state's imposing a barrier
to interstate trade; the term is not necessarily limited to the commerce clause, either in its
explicit or in its "dormant," or "negative," form.
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join in pressing their advantage with little fear that victimized
states will respond with a cartel of their own. Exploitations are
thus most troubling because their likely persistence more seriously
threatens the potential benefits of trade within a large and diverse
nation.
The United States Supreme Court has most frequently based its
response to interstate trade barriers on the "negative" commerce
clause, 6 yet its approach has been confused and chaotic.7 The
Court has treated analytically similar barriers such as subsidies
and taxes differently even though they may have the same effects
on interstate commerce. Moreover, the Court has balanced local
and national interests in reviewing some interstate barriers but has
adopted more comprehensive rules that preclude balancing in reviewing other sorts of state actions.
The major purpose of this article is to show that the distinction
between "interferences" and "exploitations" has descriptive and
normative value in understanding the judicial response to interstate trade barriers. The distinction is descriptively useful because
the Court has struck down exploitations with remarkable regularity and generally upheld state actions that lack exploitative potential. The distinction does not alone describe all the cases perfectly,
however, because the Court has invalidated other state actions
even though they also lacked exploitative potential. This article
will explore the reasons for this mixed treatment of nonexploitative interstate trade barriers.
Part I considers the nature and advisability of intervention by
the federal courts on behalf of free interstate trade. The discussion
distinguishes the judicial role in this area from that in other constitutional contexts and describes the courts as surrogates of Congress in reviewing state-created trade barriers. Because such judicial intervention requires no more than the creation of federal
common law, the courts should base their decisions on commerce
clause principles rather than on other, less reversible, constitutional grounds.
The analysis in Part II contrasts "interferences" and "exploitations" and shows that while all forms of state-imposed barriers can
See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 425 n.1, 426
nn.3-5 (1982).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 71-77, 82-86, 106-15, 141-43.

HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev. 566 1983

19831

Interstate Exploitation

interfere with free trade, only some are capable of exploiting a monopolistic advantage at the expense of other states. Part III shows
the normative and descriptive value of this distinction by applying
it to the various forms of interstate barriers that the courts have
considered.
Finally, Part IV explores one impediment in current law to explicit adoption of the suggested interference-exploitation distinction: the state action exemption in antitrust law. The article reinterprets the source of this exemption and argues that it be
reformulated and restricted to state actions that do not pose the
threat of interstate exploitation.
I. THE NATURE OF JUmCL INTERVENTION
There is a striking volume and variety of commentary on the
proper role of the judiciary in defending free interstate trade.8 Although the various views are not strictly comparable because they
focus on different forms of state-imposed interstate barriers, they
have been characterized as reflecting either "process" or "value"
perspectives.9 Process approaches emphasize the need for courts to
review state laws that burden parties not represented in the local
legislative process; value orientations support judicial intervention
when, as a matter of substantive economic policy, the burdens on
free trade imposed by a particular law appear to exceed the legitimate benefits derived from it.
Neither of these perspectives is satisfactory unblended with the
other. Process arguments that focus on political underrepresentation may tell courts when to intervene but clearly not what to decide; the latter requires "value" considerations or other instructions.10 On the other hand, a result-orientation that emphasizes the
I For a range of views see Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L.J. 219 (1957); Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause
to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982); Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in
Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate Commerce 9 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125.
0 Eule, supra note 8,at 438-43 (characterizing commentators in other areas of law and
suggesting that similar dichotomy is present in dormant commerce clause).
10 This limitation of pure process arguments is often missed. Eule is disturbed by the
court's balancing of interests and seeks to avoid a balancing requirement in his representation-enforcing approach. Id. at 441-42. He suggests measuring the disproportionality of a
state action's impact, called the "outsider impact percentage" ("OIP"), and asserts that no
disproportionality exists when the burden of legislation falls equally upon those within and
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"value" of an open economy contains the implicit assumption that

intervention is not necessary when the economic burdens of a state
action fall almost entirely within the legislating state. Thus, no
commentator suggests that courts consider intervening when faced
with state regulation of certain occupational licensing or of a utility company operating solely within the state's borders,1 1 even

though such state actions may affect the country's economic wellbeing more than do most interstate trade barriers. Even the most
the
value-oriented observer apparently assumes that in such cases
12

national interest does not conflict with local determination.
The appropriate blend of judicial and legislative activity on behalf of free trade is no different from that in other areas in which
subsequent legislative pronouncements may overrule common law.
Until the legislative branch acts, courts do what they think wise,

or, where possible, what they discern to be legislative policy. This
approach to judicial review of interstate trade barriers is not novel.

without the state. Id. at 460-74.
This approach is problematic. In the first place, it too requires the balancing of "value"
considerations because in determining whether alternative methods could accomplish the
state's legitimate purposes, courts must necessarily consider and compare the values of the
state's purposes and the foregone free trade. See id. at 473, 474, 474 nn.250-51. Furthermore, the OIP measure begs the question. Although impotent out-of-state residents and
businesses are surely worse off when no in-state forces share their interests, the mere fact
that a state's action burdens in-state and out-of-state interests equally guarantees nothing.
If all the benefits of a state action remain in-state, then a state can profit at the expense of
unrepresented out-of-state interests even if a majority of the burdens fall in-state. The real
problem is that a state may consider the in-state costs and benefits, ignoring those that flow
out of the state. Although the problem is one of degree, it is hardly solved by an unresponsive measure. In any event, Eule's calculation of the OIP measure sometimes ignores the instate burdens of trade barriers. Id. at 461 (overlooking higher cost of financial services when
out-of-state banks are excluded from the market and also failing to consider burden on
employers unable to hire nonresidents).
Tushnet, supra note 8, on the other hand, realizes that process theories necessarily contain value judgments. His approach is logical in requiring judicial intervention on substantive due process terms when "no organized interest group appears to oppose inefficient
[state actions]." Id. at 149. It therefore is simultaneously very optimistic about the wisdom
of judicial intervention and quite pessimistic about the political process. In contrast, the
approach in.this article emphasizes Congress' ability to override all judicial decisions in this
area. The interference-exploitation theme, however, ought to be useful to "process-oriented"
readers who do not share the view of judicial intervention expressed in Part I.
11But see Tushnet, supra note 8, at 141-50 (arguing that substantive judicial review is
appropriate whenever political accountability is seriously flawed).
12 There are, after all, costs (including error costs) associated with judicial intervention
and every reason to expect that those affected by the state's decision can demonstrate their
potential burden to the state legislature as easily as to Congress.
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Some twenty-five years ago, Professor Ernest Brown argued eloquently in favor of common-law judicial activism in support of an
open economy:
[W]hen the limits that the federal system imposes upon its components are in question, when the centrifugal, isolating or hostile
forces of localism are manifested in state legislation, the interests
of union require that these factors be recognized and the judicial
negative be interposed. It [is] hardly necessary to add what some
[justices] have not always recognized-the Court might the more
readily intervene against state legislation under a commerce clause
challenge, since it would at most make what it believed a proper
allocation of power, tentative and subject to reallocation by Congress; a negative in the name of substantive due process [is], however, presumably universal and final.18
Of course, the federal response to unwanted localism could be
legislative. Congress could exercise its power to regulate interstate
commerce to preempt most, if not all, fields where interstate barriers are erected. 1 ' Victimized states, producers, and consumers
might therefore seek congressional action to check interstate aggression. But what if Congress cannot focus its attention on the
myriad local laws and practices that penetrate state borders in one
way or another? In such cases, congressional action may eventually
overturn an aggressive state law but only after considerable delay.
Judicial intervention would restore the benefits of free trade more

quickly.
One might view the federal judiciary then as a surrogate or
agency1 5 of Congress instructed to protect the national interest by
overturning those state actions which an attentive Congress would
disapprove. This role requires that judicial decisions not be on inflexible and irreversible constitutional grounds. The argument for
Is Brown, supra note 8, at 220-21. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State
Power-Revised Version, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 547, 551-52 (1947).
4 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 238-42 (1978) (noting that the commerce power
is limited by Congress' own internal political realities). Note that Congress can encourage
nonuniformity among states and experimentation consistent with the federal system. See
infra note 31.
15 See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1585, 1587 n.194 (1977) (noting that in reviewing state
encroachments the judiciary "acts only as an intermediate agency between the state and
Congress" and suggesting that a federal agency with expertise and a better sense of congressional wishes might be established to act in its stead); Dowling, supra note 13, at 558.
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judicial activism is thus little more than a reference to the continuing attractiveness of the common law.", That Congress could itself
police interstate aggression strengthens, rather than weakens, the
case for common-law judicial activism. If, compared to Congress'
wishes, the federal courts prove overzealous in protecting free
trade, insufficiently deferential to state interests and determinations, or simply inadequate in exploring and interpreting facts,
then Congress can step in and use its commerce power to override
the courts. 17
II.

INTERFERENCES AND EXPLOITATIONS: THE THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

A.

How Exploitations Differ From Other Trade Barriers

Consider, for illustrative purposes, State E that taxes a unique
advantage that it enjoys-such as coal in Montana ' s or stock trans1' There are, of course, many examples of laws that are created and applied by courts and
modified by reviewing legislatures. Even when a state legislature or Congress has enacted a
comprehensive statutory framework, the common-law approach retains vitality. Courts cannot always construe statutes according to their simple language both because statutes do
not, despite their typical length, deal with every conceivable situation and because the legislature may intentionally adopt ambiguous language.
17 Of course, courts can do harm. Apart from the costs associated with litigation, misguided decisions will bring on the costs of legislative action as Congress acts to override the
courts' errors. In justifying the legislative costs of reversing judicial intervention, the question is not whether courts are better than Congress at protecting the national interest but
rather whether courts are more responsive to the national interest than are state
legislatures.
In this regard, the constitutional and judicial posture toward multistate compacts is noteworthy. The compact clause of article I, § 10 of the Constitution, requiring congressional
consent to a state's compacts and agreements with other states, can be interpreted to reflect
the themes of this article. The compact clause may be an exception to the general rule that
state actions affecting interstate commerce are reviewed by the federal courts and only occasionally by Congress itself; when an interstate compact is arranged, it is so likely to affect
unrepresented interests that Congress is called in to review the arrangement at the outset.
In actual practice, this review has been limited because the compact clause has been interpreted to require immediate congressional review only when the arrangement in question
"would enhance the political power of the member [s]tates in a way that encroaches upon
the supremacy of the United States." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n,
434 U.S. 452, 472 (1978). To the extent that "political power" in this statement really refers
to economic power, the suggested interpretation of the compact clause is reinforced. There
are, however, too few cases on the subject to characterize the judicial posture. A study of
compacts reviewed by Congress and the lessons to be drawn from their approval or rejection
is beyond the scope of this effort.
" Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
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fers in New York,1 to cite but two examples recently reviewed by
the Court-and State S that, much to the chagrin of other states,
subsidizes an in-state product or industry. In a fundamental, unrecognized way, State E's action threatens national economic welfare more than does State S's, because State E may create a monopoly that generates "deadweight," or welfare losses. The
essential evil of a monopoly is, of course, its limited output. A successfully collusive oil cartel, for example, cuts back on oil production to raise its members' profits, leaving some consumers with unsatisfied demand, although they are willing to pay more for the oil
than the social marginal cost of supplying it.2 ° A competitive market, in contrast, supplies goods to all users willing to pay the marginal cost of the good.
State E's tax has many of the same effects as an agreement
among producers in that state to raise their prices in concert by
the amount of the tax. Thus, if the state contains a sufficient portion of the available coal, the state tax on coal may cause a decrease in coal production-and an increase in its price-to monopoly levels.21 The difference between state E's tax and the private
cartel's fixed price is that the state government, rather than the
producers, directly receives the monopoly profit. The citizens of
State E may broadly support the tax, however, because the state
treasury can redistribute the monopoly profits and do so in such a
way that all state residents would prefer the monopoly scheme.2 2
This monopolization effected by a state's tax is only successful
to the extent that competing sources in other states cannot take up
the slack in production and provide the resource to users who are
willing to pay more than its marginal cost. The extent of the ex19 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).

B. Moore, An Introduction to Modem Economic Theory 167-68 (1973).
J. Henderson & R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory 124-26, 220-21 (2d ed. 1971) (demonstrating the reduction of output that follows from a unit tax imposed on competitive and
monopolistic firms).
2' Clearly, the more injured consumers are nonresidents, the less monopoly profits are
needed to compensate the losers. The economically inclined reader might consider the relationship of consumer and deadweight losses to monopoly profits as a function of the demand curve and especially of the marginal cost curve (which yields smaller deadweight
losses when it is steeper because the missing output would have been produced at greater
cost). But a detailed, technical analysis of these variables would generate no surprises: with
even a moderate fraction of consumers out-of-state (and not atypical cost and demand functions), the monopolist-state can exploit successfully as described in the text.
10

'
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ploitable monopoly advantage therefore depends on aggregate instate market power. This power may derive from natural resources,
migratory patterns, industry entry barriers, geographic location, or
a variety of other factors. Even if market power is divided among
sources in several states, the potential for monopolistic exploitation still exists if all of those states impose similar barriers. In the
Montana coal case, other coal-producing states actually have enacted similar severance taxes, 28 so that a real monopoly problem
exists to the extent that other energy sources are inadequate substitutes for coal.
In contrast to state exploitation of monopoly power through limiting production at the expense of consumers in other states, consider State S's support of its own production in a way that equally
harms some economic interests in other states. A production subsidy encourages and expands output beyond presubsidy levels,
avoiding the monopoly danger of limiting output. Even if State S
enjoys a unique and exploitable advantage, it must limit output in
order to effect monopolization. A subsidy, unlike a tax or regulation, is simply not such a limiting device, and is therefore unobjectionable on monopoly grounds. State S also cannot monopolize at
the expense of other states unless it enjoys an exploitable advantage. If a state erects a barrier that does not pertain to a unique
resource, its interference with trade is largely at its own expense,
even if the barrier has the effect of limiting output. Just as in the
Mississippi ban on Louisiana milk," in-state interests, such as consumers burdened by the regulation, are likely to object to the interference.2 5 Additionally, injured states may retaliate in a manner
that eventually leads to the dismantling of all the barriers.26 Perhaps more importantly, any surviving interferences may reflect unselfish local judgments about the need for government intervention
in the marketplace.
" Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 638-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the substantial fossil fuel resources held and taxes enacted by Montana, Wyoming, and
North Dakota).
14 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
The disadvantaged in-state interests also include those that pay taxes or other charges
to finance the state support and those that compete with the product that the state
subsidizes.
16 No exploitable advantage is required for such retaliation.
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B. Significance of the Distinction Between Exploitations and
Interferences
This theoretical framework does not suggest that interferences-that is, barriers that do not both limit output and concern
a unique resource-are harmless. Indeed some interferences can
generate welfare losses that exceed those generated by exploitative
monopolies, even though they do not exploit consumers in other
states. Because of their likely persistence, however, exploitations
are more troublesome than interferences and should trigger more
careful judicial scrutiny.
The importance of the interference-exploitation distinction is
perhaps better stated in terms that reflect the justifications for
common-law judicial intervention discussed in Part I. For purposes
of restating the distinction, state-imposed barriers might be regarded as falling into one of three categories: (1) those with the
potential to use monopoly power to exploit other states-that is,
"exploitations"; (2) those that substantially burden out-of-state interests in nonexploitative fashion-here, "interferences"; and (3)
those that impose virtually all their costs on in-state interests.
Courts making common law subject to congressional review
should disallow state statutes that exploit monopoly power and
benefit the legislating state at the expense of other states. Monopolistic inefficiency is undesirable and there is every reason to think
that Congress itself disapproves of monopolization.17 Furthermore,
the political incentives for creating and maintaining exploitations
lead one to suspect that, in contrast to interferences, they are more
likely to persist and to be based on motives that are inconsistent
with the national interest. Therefore, the judiciary should presume
that Congress, in the case of exploitations, would be unlikely to
defer to local decisionmaking.
In contrast to exploitations, courts might strike down interferences only when the economic costs they create clearly exceed their
benefits. As in the case of exploitations, the justification for intervention in this setting is twofold. First, although burdened in-state
interests may benefit nonresidents indirectly by overturning an interference through their state political process, federal courts
might use commerce clause principles to protect nonresidents from
The antitrust laws are substantial evidence for this proposition.
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the vagaries and imperfections of in-state politics.2 8 This justification suggests judicial inquiry into, but not necessarily invalidation
of, a state-imposed barrier. Invalidation would occur only if the
burdens of the barrier as a substantive matter overwhelm its benefits when viewed from a neutral national perspective. Second, one
might justify judicial intervention in cases of interferences as a
means of enacting implied congressional wishes, thereby foreshadowing and conserving legislative effort. While such courtroom activism might provoke criticism, judicial balancing in this area is no
more unpredictable than either congressional balancing resulting
in detailed legislation or other familiar common-law case dispositions. The Court presently takes this approach in reviewing many
types of interstate barriers. Of course, the Court might lighten its
own workload and allow other neutral observers, such as the lower
federal courts, to engage in this balancing, leaving the Court to review only state supreme court cases in this area. But whatever
scope of review the Supreme Court employs, it should not be criticized simply because the substance of its review of interferences
often turns on small facts and lacks precedential value, as common-law decisions in other areas of the law "suffer" from the same
shortcomings.
Finally, there is the question whether the federal courts should
intervene when confronted with state actions that are neither exploitations nor interferences as defined in this article, but instead
impose virtually no costs outside the legislating state. Here there is
no threat of exploitation of out-of-state interests. Nor is there need
to protect nonresidents from the legislating state's political process; any "process" objection can be argued before neutral state
courts. Conceivably, federal courts might intervene if they could
predict Congress' intentions, but surely it is hard to divine these
intentions, unless the question is already one of federal preemption. 29 One might assume instead that Congress would accept local
legislation when its costs are borne within the legislating jurisdiction, both because in many areas state legislatures may be appro2' Theoretically, nonresident interests have access to the political process because they
can support the election of legislators who are sympathetic to their plight. But this is true of
all plaintiffs in common law courts.
29 If Congress has already acted in a way that indicates its view on the issue before the

court, then the court's subordinate position concerning Congress' commerce power makes its
task clear.
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priate regulators, 0 and because Congress may wish to allow political and regulatory experimentation.,"

III.

APPLICATION OF THE INTERFERENCE-EXPLOITATION THEME TO
THE DECIDED CASES

This portion of the article explores the usefulness of the interference-exploitation theme in explaining the Supreme Court's treatment of interstate trade barriers. The discussion does not claim
that the decided cases can be characterized as allowing all interferences and disallowing all exploitations. The prevailing doctrines
and pigeonholes are far too numerous, muddled, and traditionally
detached from one another to permit such clean recharacterization.3 2 Instead, the discussion demonstrates that exploitations are
30 For example, Congress is unlikely to be a better regulator of a typical local utility than
is the state in which such an enterprise is located.
S The "right" amount of federalism and experimentation is one substantial theme not
explored in this article. However likely states are to exploit nonresidents and enact inefficient statutes, there is some reason to greet with discomfort most federal legislation that
regulates trade. For a provocative article on this theme, see Kitch, supra note 8. Note that a
process-oriented perspective may also cause skepticism regarding the wisdom of Congress'
economic role; special interest groups might generate more inefficient legislation if they
need only direct attention to Congress rather than to fifty state legislatures.
Another argument against uniform national legislation (be it enacted by Congress or by
cooperation among some states) is that it eliminates choice and, presumably, "consumer"
welfare. If migration costs are relatively low, then citizens can choose the "package" of government programs that they prefer. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). Migrants may not internalize the "congestion costs" they impose unless property values fully reflect crowding, W. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 50-51, 155-57 (1972),
but the point remains that federalism may offer choice in a way that citizens would prefer.
To some extent, citizens who prefer choice, and the prospect of migration, can be expected
to support nonuniform national legislation. See Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter?
Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 152, 157 (1981). Even putting interest-group considerations aside, there may be enough citizens interested in nonuniformity to
populate several states and increase the total welfare that derives from "choice," but still
too few such citizens to vote for nonuniformity at a national level.
Although these arguments are obviously related to the discussion in this article, they do
not contradict its themes. First, they are really arguments against a strong, positive commerce clause. This article accepts the fact that Congress can, for the most part, do as it
pleases in these spheres and discusses the role of the judiciary within this inherited framework. Moreover, the article adopts a normative posture only with regard to interstate "exploitations" as described in the text. The danger of legislation that imposes burdens in another jurisdiction and that imposes deadweight losses to boot is worthy of judicial
consideration regardless of whether courts ought to intervene when facing nonexploitative
barriers.
Indeed, Mississippi's barrier to imported milk, reviewed in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976), was struck down.
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more regularly disallowed by the Court. Interferences, on the other
hand, are treated in a less predictable fashion. The distinction between interferences and exploitations is, therefore, descriptively
useful in that-with a few serious exceptions discussed below 3 -one can characterize judicial decisions as disallowing exploitative state statutes.
The Supreme Court's method for reviewing state actions affecting interstate commerce has been to focus on the forms that these
barriers assume. In applying the interference-exploitation theme,
therefore, Part III examines in turn the forms recognized in the
decided cases, including: subsidies (of residents and of in-state
business), preferences (in state procurement contracts, for example), quarantines, taxes affecting interstate commerce, and "other
regulations." This last category contains state actions that, unlike
taxes and subsidies, are not immediately reducible to monetary
terms, but that do not impose quarantines or create preferences.
The Supreme Court seems to have treated state actions that concern the disposition of natural resources differently from other actions that are of similar form but that concern different subject
matter. Part III therefore considers the natural resource cases after
reviewing judicial responses to the various forms of interstate barriers. Finally, this Part relates the Court's treatment of state laws
governing corporate takeovers to the interference-exploitation
theme.
The analysis of each form of interstate barrier begins with a critical description of the Court's treatment of that form; it then attempts to rationalize the Court's treatment using currently prevailing doctrines and to point to the weaknesses in, as well as the
untapped potential of, those doctrines. The analysis also evaluates
the utility of the interference-exploitation distinction in explaining
how the judiciary both does and should treat a particular form.
The Court's form orientation has the obvious value of creating
useful precedent and simplifying future review. To the extent that
prevailing judicial doctrines dealing with interstate barriers are tailored to the forms of these barriers, current law might be regarded
as sensible and efficient. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
not established a coherent and workable doctrinal structure in its
33 A major exception is Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), although it too can be salvaged. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43, 217-21.

HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev. 576 1983

Interstate Exploitation

1983]

treatments of interstate barriers. A major objective of this article is
to suggest the contours of guidelines that are both substantively
sensible and precedentially valuable.
A.

Subsidies and Preferences

1.

The Court's Approach and Current Doctrines

a.

General Economic Intervention

There is so little doubt about a state's ability to prefer its own
citizens 34 that few subsidy cases are litigated and no commentators

pause to consider the potential precedential value of these cases
with regard to other forms of state action. Thus, although states
regularly promote their own industries and build roads and other
facilities that assist private in-state business and in relative terms
disadvantage out-of-state business, such expenditures are never attacked by the disadvantaged interests.35 Subsidies are accepted
even though they may stem from parochial motives that are contrary to a national perspective. For example, expenditures that
support a tourist industry may draw away tourists from other

states so that a "national tourist board" would choose a lower level
of expenditures than the sum of the states' expenditures, which
partially offset one another.
Clearly, the courts would be entirely unsympathetic to suits by

disadvantaged out-of-state interests attacking such subsidies. The
Supreme Court has distinguished market "participation" from
market "regulation" by a state and indicated that the commerce
clause responds principally to state taxes and regulations that impede trade and not to state operations in the free market. 6
Constitutionally, there is even less objection to state programs that discriminate in
favor of another state's citizens. The program would not appear "parochial" and would invite no conceivable equal protection claim.
Note the interesting analogy to the international scene in which governments accuse one
another of subsidizing export industries or dumping goods in export markets. See C. Kindleberger & P. Lindert, International Economics 165-69 (1978) (noting the misplaced objections and responses to such trade schemes).
35 These interests are unrepresented in the political process that injures both them and,
as the text shows, the nation's economy as a whole. Note that a "pure" process approach, as
described in Part 1, has little descriptive power with regard to these subsidy cases because
subsidies surely hurt unrepresented interests, which are unable to attract congressional assistance, as much as other forms of state-imposed barriers.
38 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
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Two cases illustrate that the judiciary will accept even an explicitly parochial state action if it takes the form of a subsidy or preference. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 7 the Supreme Court upheld a
South Dakota policy of supplying cement produced by a plant
owned and operated by the state to all resident customers and
leaving nonresident orders unfilled. The state's action hurt an outof-state purchaser, Reeves, by forcing it either to use less cement
or to purchase at a higher price from other sources, including
South Dakotans who could purchase from the state's facility and
resell at a profit.38 Similarly, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,3" the Court upheld a Maryland statute that offered a
bounty to scrap processors that disposed of junked automobiles,
but imposed forbidding paperwork requirements on out-of-state
processors.40 The Court viewed the state as "participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
41
others."
Subsidies in the form of in-state procurement contract preferences are quite common; typically they either require state
purchases of specified goods to be from in-state sources or provide
that the lowest in-state bidder be awarded a contract if no out-ofstate bid undercuts the lowest in-state bid by more than a specified percentage.4 2 With rare exceptions, such preferences are validated.4 3 One of the rare exceptions concerns preferential statutes

Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806, 810 (1976).
37 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
' In upholding the plan, the Court pointed to the "patently unobjectionable purpose of

state government-to serve the citizens of the State" and characterized South Dakota's role
as unquestionably fitting the "market participant" label. Id. at 442. The state's project was
clearly a subsidy; were it selling cenlent at a market-clearing, competitive price, there would
have been no "shortage" of supply to in-state buyers and nothing to trigger the in-state
preference policy. The existence of a shortage implies a purposefully low, subsidized price.
3- 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

Id. at 801 n.11.
Id. at 810.
4'See Note, Home-State Preferences in Public Contracting: A Study in Economic Bal40
41

kanization, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 576 (1973); Comment, In-State Preferences in Public Contracting: States' Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. Colo. L. Rev. 205 (1978)
(describing the percentage and other preferences that are mandatory, reciprocal, or discretionary in the overwhelming majority of states as probably unconstitutional).
43The Supreme Court has never fully considered a state statute characterized as a prefer-

ence. For the gene.ral rule upholding preferences, see American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339
F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) (assembling Supreme Court views and concluding that an in-state
preference for state printing contracts is not unconstitutional because it merely specifies the .
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that are not limited to state purchases but extend to private contracts; judicial disfavor of such statutes may stem from the courts'
sense that the state is "regulating" as well as "participating."""
The Court has not made clear why subsidies and most preferences should be treated differently from other forms of barriers. A
recent illustration of the resulting confusion in the lower courts is

conditions of state purchases), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); American Yearbook was
cited approvingly in Reeves, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9. See also White v. Massachusetts Council
of Constr. Employers, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983) (upholding over commerce clause challenge
mayor's executive order requiring all construction projects funded in whole or in part by
city funds to be performed by a workforce at least half of which is city residents); People ex
rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 Ill.
2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975) (upholding a portion
of a statute that provided a preference for residents or laborers on public works projects
despite equal protection, privileges and immunities, and commerce clause challenges); Equitable Shipyards v. State, 93 Wash. 2d 465, 611 P.2d 396 (1980); cases collected in Comment,
supra note 42, at 218-22. The Comment seeks to describe a new, anti-preference trend by
describing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. as exceptional because the state was there
experimenting with the laudable goal of environmental protection. Id. at 221. The Comment
describes American Yearbook as "clearly wrong." Id. at 223. Interestingly, businesses, unlike
students, have apparently not challenged the length of residency requirements. See Galesburg Constr. Co. v. Board of Trustees, 641 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 1982) (validating a preference to
in-state businesses but not evaluating the one-year residency requirement because plaintiff
did not challenge the duration or enforcement of the requirement though it was applicable).
Three of the exceptions to the general rule are straightforward. People ex rel. Treat v.
Coler, 166 N.Y. 144, 59 N.E. 776 (1901) (invalidating a state statute requiring stone used in
public projects to be worked within the state) was effectively overruled by Atkin v. Kansas,
191 U.S. 207 (1903) (announcing that a state may regulate work done on its behalf as it
pleases). Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame, 430 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 979 (1979), concerned a city's discrimination against nonunion, not nonresident, contractors. Rayco Constr. Co. v. Vorsanger, 397 F. Supp. 1105, 1109-10 (E.D. Ark. 1975), was
not invalidated on commerce clause grounds but simply because the statute under review
was vague, overbroad, and irrational ("[W]e find that Act 264 violates both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. We find it unnecessary to decide
whether the Act also violates the Commerce Clause ....

"

Id. at 1110). The other prefer-

ence invalidations are discussed infra note 44.
44 See MacMillan Co. v. Johnson, 269 F. 28, 32 (1920) (invalidating on freedom of contract and due process grounds portion of statute regulating textbook sales that forced compliance on general public).
In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the Court invalidated an Alaska statute requiring contractors dealing with Alaska-owned oil to prefer residents to nonresidents in their
hiring. Because the statute operated through union hiring halls, id. at 521, it imposed burdens on private arrangements. Hicklin contains an element emphasized in Part III of this
article: the state was not required to expend its own funds in support of the preference it
legislated. See also Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966), on
remand, 98 N.J. Super. 109, 236 A.2d 176 (1967), rev'd, 53 N.J. 71, 248 A.2d 427 (1968)
(finding, on remand, a requirement that prospective seller's in-state purchases in each of
two years be at least as great as the prospective single-year sale to the state to be an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce).
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Smith v. Department of Agriculture,4 which concerned a state
practice that relegated out-of-state farmer-vendors to substantially
inferior locations during busy seasons at a farmers' market. The
marketplace was owned by the state, but the state contributed less
than fifty percent of the market's operating expenses. The majority's decision invalidating the preference for in-state sellers cited
Supreme Court decisions rejecting state statutes that protected local citizens from outside competition. 4 The decision also cited
subsidy cases, noting that the practice would have been acceptable
if Georgia had been acting in a proprietary capacity. 47 The concurring judge viewed the case as turning on whether the market in
question was for sale booths-in which case Georgia was a proprietor-or for vegetables-in which case the state was a regulator.'
Drawn to the latter view, the judge agreed to invalidate the preference, noting quite logically-in contrast to the Supreme Court
cases-that the case did not differ in principle from one involving
total exclusion of nonresidents. 4' The dissent insisted, of course, on
the relevance of the subsidy cases.5 0
One cannot help but share the Fifth Circuit's mixed reaction.
Certainly, the state could assign better booths to the highest bidders, or it could adopt a random assignment or first-come-firstserved procedure. Less restrictive (but often more bureaucratically
demanding) alternatives are virtually always available; their recognition simply complicates a court's task and highlights the differences among the various forms of interstate barriers, for it is
unimaginable that state expenditures would be invalidated even if
less burdensome programs could be created by a clever court.
b.

Residence Benefits
State subsidization of residents is also involved in the common
45 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981).
41 Id. at 1084-85 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); City of

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S:
525 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925)).

"I Smith, 630 F.2d at 1083 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

" Smith, 630 F.2d at 1086 (Gee, J., concurring).
49 Id.

- Id. at 1086-88 (Randall, J., dissenting).
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practice of offering a product or service, such as education, at a
lower price to residents than to nonresidents. Clearly, the different

tuitions in question are subsidies and not taxes. Even out-of-state
students pay less than the "real" cost of an education. Residents
are merely subsidized more than nonresidents. The underlying pol-

icy of such subsidies is surely acceptable to the Court, 51 perhaps as
state "participation" in the marketplace.

Subsidies such as tuition differentials may be invalidated, however, if they are tied to objectionable residence requirements. 2 2

Most recently, in Zobel v. Williams,53 the Court invalidated
Alaska's program to pay its citizens dividends that varied according to their length of residence. The Court was not convinced that
the differentiation among citizens was rationally related to valid
state interests.54 The Court's opinion gives no indication that it

would invalidate a dividend program that discriminated only
against nonresidents. In fact, Alaska has now turned to such a distribution program.5 5
Subsidies or benefits that depend on residence qualifications

raise an assortment of both constitutional issues and judicial sensitivities. Besides tuition differentials, such benefits include welfare
,l See Spatt v. New York, 361 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (E.D.N.Y.) (states can make their own
products more attractive so long as "imports" are not penalized; education is not a fundamental right, and student is free to migrate and seek financial aid in another state), aff'd
mem., 414 U.S. 1058 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Minn. 1970)
(state can subsidize those who have demonstrated an intention to remain and contribute),
aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1969) (state interest a valid one and resident can be reclassified after one year),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 564 (1970).
ss See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irreversible, irrebuttable presumption of
nonresidency for a single person who had been out of state at any time in the preceding year
invalidated on due process grounds).
" 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).
The state's asserted interests in the creation of an incentive to encourage migration to
Alaska and in the encouragement of prudent, far-sighted management of its oil revenues
were regarded as unrelated to the dividend plan's generous grants based on past residency.
Id. at 2313-14. A third stated interest, in recognizing past contributions of residents, was
found unconvincing and illegitimate. Id. at 2314. But see id. at 2324 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
e N.Y. Times, June 5, 1982, at A7, col. 6.
The Alaska program seems altogether more responsive to the needs of politicians than to
those of the national economy or state residents. Any dividend plan it adopts will almost
surely yield taxable income to recipients; instead, the state could distribute the funds to
local governments for road-building and other projects of general use.
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payments, 56 health care,5 7 unemployment compensation, 58 and
public housing.5 9 Apparently, the more the courts regard the benefit as a "basic necessity of life,""0 the more likely they are to use
equal protection or "right to travel" grounds to strike down any
substantial residence requirement as invidious and therefore unconstitutional discrimination. The law in this area might have
evolved differently had the state statutes carefully promoted fiscal
integrity and deterred strategic migration without imposing an obvious burden on the amorphous right to travel. Thus, the Court
might well have upheld a statute that promised newcomers the
benefits they would have enjoyed in their "old" state, but that denied for one year the increase available in the new state. But the
states drafted no such statutes and, given the constitutional rhetoric now assembled, it is unlikely that more careful statutes would
now be allowed.6
56Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating on equal protection and unascribed right-to-travel grounds one-year residency requirement as overbroad method of accomplishing valid state purposes).
57 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating one-year residency requirement for receipt of nonemergency medical care because no asserted justifications found compelling).
Galvan v. Catherwood, 324 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (upholding denial of state
unemployment benefits to applicants moving to an area with no reasonable opportunity for
employment because state's policy requiring claimant to be "ready, willing and able to
work" found reasonable and because restriction regarded as minor), aff'd sub nom. Galvan
v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973).
59Compare Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (upholding one-year residency requirement as not unreasonably restricting right to travel and as reasonably allocating available housing) with Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (invalidating
two-year requirement as discriminating against bona fide residents and not merely transients). The mixed treatment of public housing claimants may reflect uncertainty regarding
the way Congress itself would vote on such "travel" restrictions. Although Congress might
be expected to disapprove of restrictions only when it senses that the locality will continue
to expend funds to provide housing (for otherwise all poor citizens would be worse off), any
court that disposed of a case with such "agency" reasoning would surely elicit the expected
arguments from the local authorities (insisting that without restrictions no expenditures
would be forthcoming). See Cole, 435 F.2d at 812 (refusing to "pander" to voters who, it was
argued on appeal, would vote down public housing projects if open to newcomers).
:0 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
'1 See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 357 Mass. 827 (1970) (advising legislature that proposed statute giving newcomers some-but not equal-benefits
would be unconstitutional).
The argument for allowing statutes that limit newcomers to their past level of benefits is
strengthened by the fact that a state (or the United States) certainly need not continue high
benefits to citizens who move to jurisdictions that offer lower benefits, although such non-
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Even when "basic necessities" are not at stake, subsidies that
follow residence qualifications may be found to violate due process.
In this manner, a college tuition preference for state residents was
struck down because the scheme contained an irrebuttable presumption that nonresident applicants could not demonstrate that
they had attained resident status.6 2 This development has little
practical impact both because states can carry out their preferential intentions without irrebuttable presumptions and because the
"irrebuttable presumption" idea has been recognized as an unprincipled smokescreen.63 Curiously, no residence requirement cases
have involved business preferences, although there must be similar
difficulties in determining which enterprises qualify as in-state
contractors or suppliers.
Most, if not all, of the residence benefit cases would have been
better decided on commerce clause grounds than on equal protection or due process grounds. The right to travel itself could be ignored or, better yet, described as derivative of the negative commerce clause. As noted in Part I, the effect of such judicial
intervention would be to permit Congress to override courts acting
in their common-law capacity. Regardless of the practical obstacles
to developing political coalitions in Congress sufficient to enact
legislation that denies or permits states to deny necessities to migrants, it is likely that the Court itself considers Congress theoretically able to tie government expenditures to local residence requirements. For example, Congress presently redistributes wealth
to states suffering loss of revenues due to substantial emigration
by shifting the incidence of federal taxing and spending programs,
but it could achieve the same result by employing the more dramatic, yet surely equivalent, measure of placing tolls on interstate
travelers.

payment surely discourages travel. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).

Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that lawmaking requires drawing of lines in arbitrary places); Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1975).
42
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2. The Interference-Exploitation Theme Applied to Subsidies
and Preferences
a. General Economic Intervention and the Conscious Funding
Concept
The failure of commerce clause objections to a state's expenditures in favor of its own citizens follows rather neatly from the
realization that such payments are positive inducements that stimulate output rather than restrict it to monopoly levels. Thus, the
subsidization of both cement production" and in-state automobile
hulk disposal,6 5 and the channeling of state expenditures to instate contractors,"6 hardly can promote monopolistic exploitation
of other states. In all such cases the statutes are likely to yield
increased production levels. Although these statutes might well
cause overproduction as inefficient as a monopoly's underproduction, the legislating state itself pays for its action rather than profits from it, so that the legislature's judgment may be thought more
reliable than parochial. 7
The interference-exploitation theme by itself cannot explain the
judicial response to subsidies and preferences. If it did, so that all
exploitations were disallowed and all interferences upheld, then
even preferences that extended to private contracts would be allowed. Private contract preference statutes are interferences in
that they do not appear to support monopolization and cannot be
used to exploit other states. A second distinction therefore is
needed to explain how the courts decide among interferences, alSee supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-43.

WIn fact, nonresidents often profit as a result of a state's subsidy or preference. For
example, South Dakota's cement product surely satisfied some previously held demand for
cement; nonresident users of cement surely enjoyed lower prices once some consumers were
supplied by the state's facility.
The notion of inefficient overspending on the part of a community is a difficult one. Com-

munities often subsidize roads, water treatment facilities, and communications facilities in
ways that favor otherwise remote regions. Are such subsidies inefficient simply because they
do not resemble user fees? How does one evaluate the congestion costs that are saved by
such subsidies or the possibility that these subsidies reflect the community's desires rather
than the friction in the political process or the impossibility theorem? For a discussion of
the impossibility theorem in a legal context, see Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982). In sum, it is appealing to uphold all "consciously funded"
projects and focus on the monopoly inefficiencies at stake in exploitations.
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lowing those that are funded by the state government, but rejecting others.
The "conscious funding" concept suggests such a distinction.
Where the funds for a subsidy or preference benefitting some state
residents come out of the state treasury, reviewing courts might
assume that the state legislature has considered the burdens and
benefits of its action. The state probably knows the magnitude of
at least some part of the cost of the subsidy or preference. Although the cost that appears in the state budget may bear only a
very rough relationship to the magnitude of the subsidy's true economic cost, the state government is at least aware of the former
amount. To the extent that a preference is imposed on private contracts, however, the entire subsidy comes directly out of private
pockets, and there is no reason to believe that the state has estimated, much less carefully considered, any part of the costs. Such
reasoning is consistent with the distinction that has been drawn
between "participation" and "regulation," and may help explain
why the Court upholds interferences in the form of subsidies or
preferences by the state government, but rejects those imposed on
private parties.
The descriptive utility of the "conscious funding" concept is
thus apparent; its normative value is less clear. The ideal judicial
treatment of a state-imposed preference reaching private contracts,
such as one that rewards new home buyers who purchase locally
manufactured construction materials, 8 is a difficult policy question. The approach to interferences suggested in Part II involved
balancing their total national burdens and benefits. To the extent
that "conscious funding" means that balancing of at least some of
these factors has been done at the state level, the courts might
properly be more tolerant of interferences where part of the cost
comes out of the state treasury.
One form of preference imposed on private contracts that should
arguably always be suspect is one that exempts state purchases.6 9
" The example in the text is purely hypothetical.

4 Congress might be regarded as generally supportive of experimentation or "choice,"
supra note 31, but if the state excludes itself from the experiment its intentions are suspicious. It is simply not possible to construct a sensible hypothetical in which the state wishes
to offer a different "package" of programs-but then removes its own activities from the
experiment.
. A possible example of such state action is Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978),
in which
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A court might properly disallow such laws, although they do not
appear exploitative. The scheme would so carefully avoid imposing
costs on the state itself as to raise substantial doubts about its
advisability.
Nevertheless there are reasons why some interferences that are
not "consciously funded" should be allowed. Some such barriers
may not be purely parochial; for example, the state might expect
its scheme to produce positive environmental or technological benefits. More generally, Congress might regard such nonexploitative
state actions as appropriate experimentation consistent with the
70
federal structure of government.
In sum, the interference-exploitation distinction, together with
the conscious-funding notion, is capable of describing the judicial
treatment of subsidies and preferences. The general acceptance of
these forms of state action is easily linked to their nonexploitative
nature and the enacting state's direct assumption of their costs.
b.

Residence Benefits and Zobel v. Williams

The Court's response to the residence benefits cases is consistent
with the interference-exploitation theme. Because most residence
benefit schemes are subsidies and lack exploitative potential, the
Court's principal task has been to distinguish among various forms
of interferences.
Some residence benefits not only do not involve monopolistic exploitation, but also may actually increase output in areas that
would otherwise be monopolized. The generally favorable judicial
treatment of these in-state preferences is therefore sensible. State
university tuition schedules that favor residents are particularly interesting in this regard. State-subsidized tuition for medical students, for example, may be viewed as increasing output in a field
that without state-supported production would run a greater risk
of monopolization. Disallowance of discriminatory tuition schedules might be counterproductive as a matter of national economic
the state's attempted regulation of union hiring halls was a purely private imposition if the
state itself did not employ union labor.
70 "Experimentation" continues to refer to any plausible combination of novelty and
choice of which Congress would approve. Professor Kitch notes that the laboratory notion of
federalism (which is not inconsistent with our constitutional structure) is a concoction of the
Progressive Era and not of the drafters. Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate Commerce
114 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
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policy because it would lead voters and legislatures to decrease
their support of educational institutions. In fact, a state university
system that excludes nonresidents entirely seems unobjectionable.
Although newcomers might still object to the particular methods
used to distinguish nonresidents from eligible residents, such a
scheme would be regarded as nonexploitative, consciously funded,
and therefore acceptable.
As a purely descriptive matter, the most troubling subsidy case
in interference-exploitation terms is Zobel v. Williams, 71 in which
the Court declared unconstitutional Alaska's plan to distribute
72
money to citizens in proportion to the length of their residence.
The plan did not impose a threshold waiting period for the receipt
of benefits. 78 The Court strongly objected to the notion that state
programs or taxes could divide citizens into permanent classes-based in this instance on length of residence.7 A concurrence
by four justices more explicitly tied invalidation of the dividend
plan to the right to travel but declined to root this right permanently in the commerce or privileges and immunities clauses. The
concurrence indicated, in addition, that even a prospective dividend plan was objectionable when measured against the "federal
interest in free interstate migration. '75 A separate concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor is at least as strong in expressing this
same sentiment, although it roots the interest in free migration in
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution.7 6 Thus at least five justices appear to be prepared to strike
down a state subsidy that seems not only nonexploitative but also
reasonably designed to encourage the rapid settlement of a vast
state.
Viewed as an interference, the prospective part of Alaska's plan
might reasonably be struck down on commerce clause grounds if it
were prototypical and not isolated. The concurrences could argue
that if many states had such plans, then migration would in the
aggregate be discouraged. Mature and skilled citizens in each state
71

102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982).

plan distributed one unit (fifty dollars in 1979) to each citizen, 18 or older, for
each year of residency subsequent to statehood in 1959. Id. at 2311.
73 Id. at 2312.
72 The

74 Id. at 2314-15.
75 Id. at 2316 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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would hesitate to relocate-even when national economic conditions make such migration desirable-because by moving they
would exchange their advantageous positions for the relatively low
benefits accorded newcomers. Thus the prospective part of
Alaska's plan might damage national economic welfare to the extent that skilled workers are discouraged from moving to states in
which such workers might prefer to be put to their best economic
use.
The problem with this view of Zobel is that such "lock-in plans"
already exist in the form of seniority and pension systems in both
state and private employment. It is hardly likely that the majority
of the justices mean to strike down these workplace seniority
plans, although they certainly diminish the tendency to travel. The
concurring language in Zobel is thus probably best put aside and
the case viewed as limited to the actual retrospective plan under
review; the case is not about commerce and migration incentives
but rather about a more unique problem concerning the differential treatment of established citizens."
Arguably, the prospective part of Alaska's scheme has exploitative potential to the extent that it discourages mature and skilled
citizens from emigrating and allows the state to develop a unique,
exploitable resource. The possibility that a dividend plan, once in
effect, would support hoarding and monopolization is part of a
larger theoretical issue: if subsidies are always allowed, could not a
state accumulate a resource-skilled workers or nuclear power
plants perhaps-and then, if favorable circumstances develop, enjoy monopoly power at the expense of other states until they
"enter the market" by training workers or building power plants of
their own?
The argument that the potential for exploitation justifies the
Zobel decision is not very convincing, however. It is far from clear
that exploitation, when preceded by accumulation, should cause
concern. Unlike the prototypical Montana coal case considered in
Part II, the state itself will have expended funds to create its
unique advantage. Moreover, the state is taking the risk that circumstances will not develop in its favor. The labor force may need
workers with different skills, or other energy sources may under7 The decision remains open to criticism because there does not appear to be a group
that is disadvantaged in a constitutional, rather than economic, sense.
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price the nuclear power plants. The hypothetical "accumulating"
state might be regarded then as investing in the future. If it is denied rewards even though the future develops as the subsidizing
state has conjectured, then such investments will be discouraged
and the economy as a whole may be worsened. 78 Thus exploitation
that follows conscious accumulation might be regarded benignly, as
are the rewards to an inventor in the patent system.
A second response to concern about this potential for accumulation draws on the ideas expressed in Part I, given that Congress
can always put an end to the exploitation if it so chooses. Because
successful accumulation-exploitation schemes are probably extremely rare, congressional attention is relatively assured. 79 In such
a situation, judicial supervision on behalf of Congress is less necessary than in the case of other exploitations.
In sum, the principal value of the interference-exploitation
theme in understanding judicial review of subsidies in general and
residency benefits in particular is to emphasize the absence of the
danger of exploitation. Accumulation, and other subsidy and preference plans, can be comfortably allowed so long as actual exploitations made possible by such plans are discovered and carefully limited. Part IV's discussion of the state action exemption in
antitrust law reconsiders this special need to monitor carefully for
exploitations in a scheme that permits all subsidies.
B.
1.

Quarantines

Current Doctrines

Until recently, the courts treated facially reasonable state-imposed quarantines and similar restraints on imports from other
states as per se valid, much as subsidies and preferences. Again,
this judicial acceptance extended to state actions that clearly dis0
criminated against other states' products. Thus, Reid v. Colorado"
71 A successful speculator that sells competitively will increase consumer welfare but one
that sells monopolistically may or may not (depending on whether the deadweight loss exceeds the gain generated from the speculator's resource-shifting). Lerner, My Son the Speculator, in Everybody's Business 32-40 (1962).
7' Such schemes are also likely to be of large scale and, therefore, readily noticed.
80 187 U.S. 137 (1902). But see Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877), where the Court
struck down a purported quarantine by Missouri which prohibited the importation of all
Texan, Mexican, or Indian cattle between March 1 and November 1. The breadth of the
state action led the Court to conclude that it was neither a quarantine nor an inspection law
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upheld Colorado's statute criminalizing the importation of suspect
livestock. Although the Court reserved the right to consider
whether a state's quarantines were reasonable, it tolerated state actions that claimed to protect health and similar local concerns."1
The Court's recent invalidation in City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey e2 of a statute excluding unacceptable out-of-state waste"
demonstrates, however, that even in this relatively minor pigeonhole the Court's form orientation has resulted in confusion and a
diminishing of precedential value. The Court distinguished the
New Jersey statute from the old quarantine cases by asserting that
the latter concerned "articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their very movement risked contagion and other evils. ' ' " Had New Jersey based
its statute on such danger of movement rather than on harm arising after the disposal of waste in landfill sites, the Court might
have approved the scheme, declining to inquire into the hazards of
waste or into available alternative protective measures.
The unreasoned form orientation and the resulting lack of careful inquiry in the earlier quarantine cases seems doomed to be exposed by labelling difficulties. So many interstate barriers can be
reformulated as quarantines that the Court must either abdicate
its role as a protector of free trade or abandon its tolerant posture
toward this form of state action. Consider the evolution of "quarantine law" that could have followed the Court's acceptance of the

but a "plain intrusion" upon interstate commerce under the pretense of state police power.
Id. at 473. Reid's distinguishing feature was almost surely the quarantine-true structure of
its statute. Imported cattle were not entirely banned; provided they were inspected or quarantined for a specified period of time, the cattle were allowed. It is extremely unlikely that a
court would consider the reasonableness of the specified period or the severity of the feared
disease.
"1 Clearly, a state may impose a quarantine that "discriminates" against interstate commerce; Colorado almost surely contained livestock within its boundaries and there is no
indication that these animals were expelled. In imposing a legitimate quarantine, the state
simply tries to keep a bad situation from getting worse. This feature of quarantines was
apparently missed in Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982) (invalidating statute banning importation of spent nuclear fuel because state was "quite willing to
allow the storage and even the shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel... provided only
that its origin is intrastate").
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
" Waste materials intended for recycling were excepted from the quarantine. Id. at 619
n.2. The quarantine also did not apply to waste materials certified by the appropriate state
commissioner.
Id. at 628-29.
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New Jersey waste-control statute on the basis of precedents such
5 in
as Reid. In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell,"
which the Court invalidated the ban on milk imports referred to at
the beginning of this article, the state might have argued more
forcefully that, because of the perceived health dangers of "foreign" milk, it was enacting a quarantine.86 Thus, although the
Court's review of the New Jersey waste-control statute did introduce uncertainty, uncertainty was the inevitable product of the
Court's form orientation.
2. Exploitative Potential of Quarantines
The interference-exploitation distinction is of some value in this
area. In consonance with the suggested approach, courts could allow reasonable-looking quarantines and inquire more deeply only
when the quarantine poses monopoly or monopsony 7 dangers.
Thus, quarantines on uninspected cattle or fruit would be unobjectionable, as nonexploitative, unless the state somehow possesses a
regional monopoly on grazing land or processing plants, enjoys an
unusually strategic location on the way to market, or contains a
high proportion of the quarantined product's consumers."
The state's exclusion of waste intended for in-state disposal, invalidated in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, was not an exploitative barrier unless out-of-state interests owned the landfill
sites in New Jersey and such sites were limited. In that case, the
state might wish to exclude other buyers of landfill space in order
to exploit in-state monopsony power. Even if in-state interests own
all the waste disposal sites, the state might also have wished to
exclude other buyers in order to keep down its own price of waste
disposal. But the latter is an in-state distribution and efficiency
sI

424 U.S. 366 (1976). See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.

M

In the actual case, which of course preceded the waste-control case, the Court dis-

missed Mississippi's health interest as "border[ing] on the frivolous," noting that even if
Louisiana's milk standards were lower than Mississippi's, the Mississippi statute would have

still
admitted Louisiana milk if the two states had entered a reciprocity agreement. Cottrell,
424 U.S. at 375.
7 For a basic analysis of buyers with market power, or monopsonists, see W. Vickrey,
Microstatics 291-94 (1964).
"Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), might be regarded
as an illustrative example. California's high share of consumers, on the other hand, may
have stemmed from efforts expended in that state. See infra note 154.
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issue burdening, for the most part, those New Jerseyans who own
property that might be used for landfill. Thus the decision might
be regarded as a common-law review of an interference, in which
case the interference-exploitation distinction itself offers little
guidance as to the proper disposition.
In any event, the usefulness of the interference-exploitation distinction in analyzing quarantine cases is limited for the reason expressed above: it is difficult to draw a sensible line between
quarantines and other forms of interstate barriers because so many
barriers can be reformulated as quarantines.8 9 In appealing to the
federal courts to invalidate interstate barriers, plaintiffs might increase their chances for success by showing how the "quarantines"
they face might be replaced by alternatives that satisfy the state's
interest in public health and that offer less potential for monopolistic or monopsonistic exploitation.
C. Taxes and Tolls
1. Current Doctrines
Historically, the Court has treated taxes affecting interstate
commerce less deferentially than subsidies and other expenditures.
The Court has generally struck down taxes that superficially appear designed to fall more heavily on nonresidents-for example,
commuters or multistate businesses-and has upheld other, apparently neutral taxes. This treatment sharply contrasts with
the Court's general approval of avowedly discriminatory
expenditures."
a. Taxes on Interstate Business
The Court has announced that it will not permit taxes that "discriminate" against interstate commerce 1 The Court's approach is
89

See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 35-43 and note 51.
,1 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The history of judicial
treatment of state taxes affecting interstate commerce has been analyzed elsewhere. See J.
Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 237-51 (4th ed. 1978); Hellerstein,
Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1, 1223. Briefly put, the Supreme Court first drew hair-splitting and unpredictable lines between
state taxes imposed "directly" on interstate commerce and taxes that it viewed as indirect,
incidental, or local in nature. Compare Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268
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to look only at a tax's most superficial and obvious impact and
generally to ignore whether any apparently discriminatory impact
merely offsets other state fiscal programs that might discriminate

in favor of nonresidents. If the tax on its face seems designed to
affect interstate businesses or nonresidents more severely, the
Court places the burden of proving the tax's neutrality on the

state; in contrast, if discrimination is not obvious, the burden of
proof is on the party challenging the tax. Because it is difficult
either to allocate net income or to assess the benefits that an interstate business receives from specific states, a business can rarely
prove that a tax discriminates nor can a state prove that the tax
does not. Thus, the Court's original allocation of the burden of
proof based on a very superficial inquiry virtually decides the
issue.
One frequently litigated type of tax scheme that illustrates the
Court's approach is state apportionment and taxation of the inU.S. 203 (1925) (invalidating a franchise tax measured by interstate activity which applied
to both interstate and intrastate business) with Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,
141 U.S. 18 (1891) (upholding a property tax on rolling stock levied on interstate and intrastate businesses as "indirect"). See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895)
(upholding a tax carefully levied on foreign corporations' in-state property in lieu of other
taxes on intrastate business). During this period the Court viewed exclusively interstate business as beyond the reach of a state's taxing power. See Alpha PortlandCement Co., 268
U.S. at 218.
Beginning, however, with its acceptance in 1938 of a state tax on the total revenues of a
locally published but broadly circulated magazine, the Court moved towards its current position: a state may impose a "nondiscriminatory" income tax on an out-of-state corporation
doing interstate business in the taxing state. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938). See generally J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, supra, at 242-88.
In Complete Auto Transit, the Court announced four criteria for the validity of such a
tax: (1) The tax must be applied to an activity or property that has a substantial nexus with
the taxing state; (2) The tax must be fairly apportioned to in-state activities; (3) The tax
must not discriminate against interstate commerce; (4) The tax must not be unfairly disproportional to benefits received from the state. Id. at 287. See Hellerstein, supra, at 19-23.
Three of these criteria are so easily met as to be unimportant in practice. Requirements
(1), (2), and (4) are so easily discovered by a sympathetic Court-on the basis of a single
employee (nexus), arbitrarily chosen tax bases (fair apportionment), and the advantages of a
civilized society (state benefits)-that the test seems to collapse into the third requirement.
See Hellerstein, supra, at 19-23. Therefore, only this requirement-that the tax must not
"discriminate" against interstate commerce-is of much interest. A state may not, consistent with the commerce clause, "impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business." Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting a case decided before Complete Auto Transit, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959)).
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come of multistate business entities. In the context of apportionment schemes, discrimination means duplicative, or multiple, taxation. A tax on the income of an interstate business is
discriminatory if the same income is taxed by two different states
and the income of a domestic business would be taxed only once.
The reason for apportionment schemes is clear: if a state could
only tax those enterprises incorporated within it, then it could tax
all the income earned by these businesses and not be considered to
discriminate, because by hypothesis no other state could also tax
that income.2 But states would then compete for business incorporations with the possible result that businesses would not pay for
the benefits that they enjoy. Moreover, the place of incorporation
is not necessarily where a business earns its profit.9 3 Therefore, instead of taxing only locally incorporated business, a state typically
uses a formula to determine the fraction of a multistate entity's
income that is economically attributable to business within the
state. If all states adopted the same formula or Congress insisted
on such a formula," there would be no multiple taxation95 and,
therefore, no discrimination against interstate business. But the
states have adopted a variety of formulas over the years,' and
their inconsistency has surely led to a fair amount of multiple taxation-and undertaxation as well.
The Court generally approves apportionment schemes because of
their apparent neutrality. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,97
in which the Court considered the multiple taxation issue, exemplifies this approval. The plaintiff was a firm doing business in
both Illinois and Iowa. Like a majority of states, Illinois employs a
92 On average, therefore, interstate activity would not make businesses worse off. Some

states of course might have higher tax rates than others so that some businesses would
prefer a different tax treatment of interstate activities. Courts implicitly assume, as will this
discussion, that such rates are not purposefully raised by states that regularly contain parts
of interstate businesses.
" Delaware's well-known popularity as a place for incorporation is the most obvious example. For a quantification of this popularity, see Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
" Substantial effort has been expended to arrive at such a uniform formula, but no legislation has emerged. See H.R. Rep. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Seas. (1965) (four volumes).
" In general, "multiple taxation" refers to a situation in which an entity's tax base is
subject to repeated (more than 100 percent) taxation by other jurisdictions that tax the
entity (at whatever combined rate).
For a collection of the various tax bases, see Hellerstein, supra note 91, at 21.
437 U.S. 267 (1978).
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three-factor formula that includes the in-state fractions of a firm's
total sales, payroll, and property.9 8 Iowa, in contrast, uses only the
first of these three factors."' The Court upheld Iowa's tax and
characterized the discrimination claim as merely describing the potential consequences of nonuniform state rules; 10 0 any undue tax
burden, the majority noted, resulted no more from Iowa's statute
than from Illinois'. 10 1 The Court insisted that the plaintiff had
02
failed to prove multiple or duplicative taxation.
The proof of duplicative taxation that the Court asked for in
Moorman is nearly impossible to obtain; businesses, like the states
that seek to tax them, can hardly trace their profits to particular
sales, employees, or assets in a way that is anything but speculative.10 3 Nor can businesses, assess the benefits that they receive
from specific states any more than can the states themselves determine accurate user fees. 10 The apparent placement of the burden
of proof on the business thus determines the outcome for challenges to this form of tax. Apportionment formulas, like state expenditures, are thus virtually always acceptable to the Court despite their discriminatory potential. In reviewing this form of tax,
the Court has declined "agency work"10 5 and refused to use the
commerce clause to impose uniformity among the various apportionment strategies of the states.
The Court has invalidated as discriminatory, however, taxes on
business income that seem on the surface designed to affect out-ofstate businesses more severely than in-state businesses. If discrimination seems obvious, the Court puts the burden of showing the
tax's neutrality on the state and does not consider the impact of
the state's fiscal programs as a whole. In Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
" 437 U.S. at 283.
The taxpayer was, as a result, subject to overlapping taxes on about six percent of its
income. Id. at 270 n.3, 271 n.4.
100 Id. at 277 n.12.
101 Id. at 276-77.
102 Id. at 276.
:03 Id. at 276 & n.11.
04 Although many state services might be financed by accurate and efficient user charges,
many other government-provided goods are not easily priced to reflect either their marginal
cost or their value to individual users. See R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in
Theory and Practice 195-97 (1973).
105 For a sense of the enormity of such work, see H.R. Rep. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) (four volumes of reports, reflecting consideration of a variety of tax bases, statutes,
proposals, and difficulties).
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Glander,'°8 for example, Ohio taxed accounts receivable of out-ofstate corporations attributable to goods shipped from or sales
made in Ohio and quite consistently exempted such receivables of
in-state corporations attributable to goods shipped from or sales
made out-of-state. If all states adopted Ohio's strategy, there
would be little, if any, overlapping of formulas or multiple taxation. But because most states-including Wheeling's home
state-tax all intangibles of their domestic corporations, 10 7 the
Court ruled Ohio's taxing scheme invalid because it discriminated
against out-of-state business. 10 8 Although Moorman fails to distinguish-or even to mention-Wheeling, there is no reason to think
that Wheeling would be decided any differently today; the multiple taxation of interstate business in a scheme such as Ohio's is so
obvious that-although it is no more the result of Ohio's statute
than other states' taxing schemes-the Court could not possibly
expect Congress to approve of the state's action.
Ohio might have defended the tax by arguing that it should not
be examined independently of the state's whole fiscal structure,
and that the seemingly discriminatory tax on intangibles helped to
ensure that out-of-state businesses fairly supported the statefunded services that they enjoyed. Out-of-state businesses, for example, are less subject to property taxes that provide benefits,
such as a skilled labor force, that in turn benefit out-of-state business.10 9 In short, Ohio might have argued that its apparently discriminatory tax simply offset other taxes that discriminate in their
impact against in-state interests. Whether or not this assertion
would have ultimately proven true, the Court's failure even to consider the issue illustrates the generally superficial nature of its
inquiry.

1- 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
107

Id. at 574.

108 The decision was based on equal protection considerations. Id. at 570-72.
109 Of course, Ohio might have imposed a duplicative tax on property owned out-of-state

to compensate for use of the property tax as an in-state revenue raising device. Such a tax,
however, would be vulnerable to objection because a state has no "nexus" with out-of-state
property that it wishes to tax. The objection would likely be on due process grounds. The
incorporation of the nexus requirement into commerce clause decisions, see Hellerstein,
supra note 91, at 19, 20 & n.107, reflects the inevitable process orientation of negative commerce clause analysis. Presumably, Congress could itself approve of interstate property taxation in a way that satisfied process-oriented observers, inasmuch as all interests are, theoretically, represented in Congress.
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The Court also invalidated a superficially discriminatory tax in
Austin v. New Hampshire.110 In that case, the Court struck down a
tax on commuting nonresidents employed in New Hampshire,
which had no income tax of its own. As in Wheeling, the state
might have argued this case on "offsetting discrimination"
grounds. In invalidating the tax under the privileges and immunities clause, the Court noted both that the tax was not offset by the
state's ten-dollar annual resident tax,i' and that the state's taxes
on business profits, real estate transfers, and property were paid
by residents and nonresidents alike. 2 This analysis, however,
looks only at the superficial characteristics of these taxes. New
Hampshire might have claimed that property ownership and
use-like many tax bases-are poorly correlated with enjoyment of
state-funded services, and that the separate tax on commuters offset the discrimination of an apparently neutral property tax
against residents. As in Wheeling, the Court failed to examine this
possibility.
Nippert v. City of Richmond'1 " provides a third example of judicial invalidation of a superficially discriminatory tax. In that case,
the Court invalidated a city ordinance that levied an annual license tax on solicitors, or "drummers." The tax, although applied
to all solicitors whether employed by local or interstate businesses,
probably fell more heavily on the latter, because relatively few local businesses employed roving salespeople. In this case, as in
Wheeling and Austin, the taxing authority might have argued that
taxes,
the license fee structure involved at most merely offset other
11 4
such as property taxes, routinely paid by local business.
It is quite unlikely that the Court would have decided any of
these three cases differently had the offsetting discrimination argument been made. Taxes that superficially appear to affect interstate business more severely-whatever their actual impact-elicit
judicial intervention. These cases are, then, at odds with Moor110420 U.S. 656 (1975).
1
Id. at 665 n.10.
"' Id. at 659 n.3.
113

327 U.S. 416 (1946).

11, The discussion in the text does not imply that such offset arguments should automatically overcome judicial objections. Indeed, even when the fiscal system-including taxes,
charges, and all benefit programs-is viewed in its entirety, nonresidents may still suffer
discrimination.
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man, in which the Court placed the burden of proving discrimination on the taxpayer and did not ask the state to demonstrate neutrality. Clearly, the forms of the taxes in Wheeling, Austin, and
Nippert aroused the Court's fear of local favoritism,115 While the
form of the tax in Moorman appeared less likely to pose this danger. Although the three invalidation cases may reflect fiscal systems that actually discriminate in favor of in-state businesses and
Moorman may not, the Court never reached this question. Instead,
it assigned the determinative burden of proof according to the superficial effects of the tax in question.
An important exception to the Court's myopic view of discriminatory tax burdens is its treatment of sales taxes and "use," or
"compensating," taxes. Typically, when a state imposes a sales tax,
residents are inclined to purchase goods in other states that do not
tax retail sales to nonresidents.1 18 To discourage such jurisdictionshopping, a state might enact a tax on the in-state use of goods
purchased out-of-state. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 1 7 the
Court upheld such a tax, recognizing, however, that a superficial
view of the use tax would find it discriminatory because it applies
only to interstate business." 8 Of course, use taxes and sales taxes
are more easily linked to one another than are drummers' license
fees and property taxes in Nippert or commuter and property
taxes in Austin. Nonetheless, all of these cases do present the same
issue of offsetting discrimination once one strips away the differences in their forms and looks more carefully at the effects of the
taxes involved.

115 327 U.S at 434-35.

The buyer will only take physical possession in the buyer's home state. The "selling
state" could impose a property tax on retail stores in lieu of a sales tax but such a tax would
discourage inventory maintenance and would raise prices relative to other states (to which
consumers could flock).
117 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
'Is Id. at 583-84. In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963), the
Court invalidated a use tax that reached equipment that would not have been subject to the
state sales tax if purchased in state. The Court's sensible but limited attraction to the compensating feature of the use tax is thus clear. Id. at 69-70.
The nexus (due process) requirement that is apparently not met in the case of use taxes
was "solved" by focusing on the in-state location of the good between the time of importation and consumption. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 180-81 (1939).
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b. Tolls and Taxes on Common Carriers
A toll is an interesting but surprisingly unlitigated form of tax
that deserves special mention. Tolls collected on bridges, tunnels,
and older highways may sometimes bring in more revenue than is
needed for the surrounding facility and may, with little subtlety,
discriminate against out-of-state vehicles. 119 Yet there has been no
litigation regarding such tolls.
Courts, however, have reviewed tolls that take the form of taxes
on vehicles and common carriers. As in the apportionment cases,
the superficial neutrality of tolls means that the burden of proof of
discrimination is placed on the challenger, and, as in the apportionment cases, the burden of proof is dispositive. A tollpayer that
must prove that the toll paid exceeds the value of the benefits received is surely doomed to failure. In Capital Greyhound Lines v.
Brice, 2 ° the Court considered a Maryland title tax equal to two
percent of the value of the appellant's vehicles. The statute also
imposed a tax of one-thirtieth of a cent per passenger seat-mile.
Both taxes applied to all common carriers and so, although Greyhound's vehicles travelled on only nine miles of the state's roads,
the statute did not seem grotesquely discriminatory in form. The
Court upheld the tax, agreeing that the state need not relate taxes
to the benefits of road use in a precise manner. 21 Thus, there is
every reason to think that all tolls, like apportionment formulas,
would survive judicial review.
c. Excise Taxes
The Court's treatment of state excise taxes on specific goods or
privileges seems even more superficial and difficult to rationalize
than its treatment of the taxes already discussed. Again, the Court
upholds taxes in this category so long as they are facially neutral.
Thus, state taxes on the privilege of doing business in corporate
form have been upheld, 22 without any analysis of the burdens that
"'For example, some toll facilities offer discount books that are useful only to frequent
users who are, of course, local residents and not occasional passers-by. States also tend to
place toll booths near their borders and to use tollroad funds for local road maintenance.
See Wall St. J., June 22, 1982, at 37, col. 1.
120 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
1

The decision is elegantly and soundly criticized in Brown, supra note 8, at 232.

",

Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
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they impose on interstate commerce. Similarly, a Montana severance tax on coal extracted in that state was held valid. The Court
did not suggest an analysis of the true impact or incidence of the
tax but simply noted that the tax applied without regard to
whether the coal remained in-state or was exported.123
Similarly, the Court has struck down facially discriminatory
taxes without careful examination of their total impact. In Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,12 4 the Court found that
a New York transfer tax on securities transactions discriminated
against interstate commerce "by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business." 125 The tax was by its terms significantly
more severe with respect to out-of-state sales than in-state ones. 2 6
In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court invalidated a Louisiana tax
that contained provisions clearly intended to exempt in-state consumers from the tax imposed on natural gas coming into the state
from the outer continental shelf.12 In neither case did the Court
consider the relationship between the incidence of the tax and the
benefits provided by the state, but in neither does it seem likely
that the tax could have been so justified.
On its current path, the Court might never examine more than
the most obvious characteristics of the kinds of taxes discussed
above.1 29 The Court's approach to these cases is simplistic and
somewhat predictable. Regardless of their actual impact, these
taxes will be invalidated when they seem, at least on the surface,
designed to affect out-of-state businesses and residents more severely than local ones. This treatment is therefore quite different
from the course that the Court has taken with regard to other

11 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). The case is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 141-43, 217-22.
124 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
" Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.

450, 458 (1959)).
12 The transfer tax, applied to transactions conducted at least in part in-state, was reduced 50% for nonresidents selling in New York, and was limited to a maximum (of $350)
for any one transaction involving an in-state sale. 429 U.S. at 324.
127 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
128 The Court focused on the credits and exemptions available to local utilities, distribu-

tors, and other in-state users. Id. at 756.
"I Such an examination would involve difficult tax-incidence and tax-benefit analyses.
See R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 104, at 354-72; Hellerstein, supra note 91, at
27-42.
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forms of interstate barriers."'
2. Exploitative Potential of Taxes and Tolls
The exploitative potential of taxes and other state-imposed barriers that constrain production for out-of-state sale-rather than
encourage in-state supply-is apparent in a broad variety of circumstances. As in all monopolistic settings, this exploitative power
vanishes as substitutes emerge for the good in question. Thus if a
state enjoys a unique resource, such as a port facility, it can use
that resource to exploit out-of-state consumers by any means that
limits the "sale" of port usage, including taxation and regulation of
vessels, tonnage, or labor. If the state owns the facility itself, then
it can limit output and achieve monopoly profits directly through
the prices that it charges. The monopoly is nonetheless limited by
the extent to which other harbors, methods of transportation, and
nonimported goods can be substituted at a cost lower than the monopoly premium. Developers of these substitutes may be deterred
from entry, however, because the exploitative state can always
lower its price and inflict grave losses on these developers who, by
hypothesis, cannot survive in a more competitive environment.",1
Even where the state does not itself own the unique resource,
monopolistic exploitation is possible. If an industry has concentrated in one state, for example, that state has the opportunity to
exploit. The location of the major capital markets in New York is a
good illustration. A tax, a state-enforced price schedule, or other
regulation of security sales or brokers' licenses can easily enable
the state to exploit nonresident consumers in a way that more than
compensates residents who also pay higher prices. The "barrier"
thus does not need to be discriminatory on its face. Of course the
larger the percentage of consumers of the taxed item who live instate, the less successful the exploitation will be. Futhermore, the
industry can migrate to another state that promises not to exploit
the monopoly that will develop. But such migration requires time,
organization, and relocation expenditures, and businesses that consider moving must take the risk that these promises will be broken.
SO See

supra text accompanying notes 34-44, 80-81.

See F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 234 (2d ed.
1980) (describing dominant firm's ability to keep out entrants if their unit cost exceeds that
of the dominant firm).
3
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Not all taxes on such an industry would create monopolistic welfare loss, however. A profits tax on a captive industry, such as the
stock brokerage business in New York, will also yield the state a
portion of the available economic rent, but unlike most other taxes
and regulations it will not cause firms to limit output.13 Thus,
some kinds of state taxes concerning unique advantages and resources do not support monopolistic exploitation but instead simply transfer wealth from specific enterprises to state citizens. Once
again, if too burdensome, such a tax operates effectively only until
firms relocate to other jurisdictions.
On a smaller scale and over a still shorter period, virtually every
successful business that is owned by nonresidents offers a unique
resource to exploit. The state's ability to exploit through use of a
tax is limited, once again, by the business' ability to relocate. 133
The potential for such exploitation might have justified the early
judicial intolerance of all taxes imposed "directly" on interstate
13 4
commerce.
a.

Taxes on Interstate Business

The Supreme Court's invalidation of "discriminatory" taxes on
interstate business can be recharacterized as disallowance of state
actions with exploitative potential. Austin v. New Hampshire 5 illustrates this possibility. The location of businesses in New Hampshire employing out-of-state residents offers an opportunity for exploitation. Commuting employees who must sell their labor in New
Hampshire can be exploited monopsonistically by a tax on their
earnings. Exploitation is, of course, limited by the ability of employers and workers to migrate out of state. Such relocation, however, is more difficult the more both the in-state businesses and
the exploited workers would need to reinvest in alternative arrangements. Thus, taxes such as New Hampshire's might properly
be regarded with suspicion to the extent that they are imposed on
businesses and workers who cannot easily relocate. The Court's invalidation of the commuter tax might follow from the conclusion
See J. Henderson & R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory 219-21 (2d ed. 1971).
For a case involving such relocation, see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
I See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
12

133

235 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
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that it would be relatively expensive for the affected businesses to
relocate or for their commuting employees to find other work appropriate to their skills.
Arguably, the Court's intolerance of facially discriminatory taxes
is consistent with the exploitation-interference theme. Such taxes
seem more likely to be designed to exploit out-of-state interests
than taxes that affect in-state and out-of-state interests uniformly.
The interference-exploitation distinction is particularly interesting with regard to the Court's exceptionally sympathetic treatment
of use taxes on goods purchased out of state.13 6 Although use taxes
cannot support monopolistic exploitation because they are imposed
on goods produced out-of-state, they might support monopsonistic
exploitation if the state's goal is to limit demand in an anticompetitive manner. Such a scheme can hardly be translated into practice, however; it is difficult to identify a state that contains most of
the buyers of a good produced out-of-state-and that therefore
could organize a monopsony-much less a state that could profitably monopsonize the markets for the range of retail goods covered
by sales and use taxes. The Court's acceptance of compensating
use taxes seems sensible, therefore, because such taxes prevent residents who shop out-of-state from avoiding their responsibility to
pay for the state services they enjoy, and such taxes seem unlikely
to be exploitative. On the other hand, the Court might make an
exception to its tolerant treatment of use taxes in the rare case
where monopsonistic exploitation is possible. A use tax narrowly
focused to coordinate with a jurisdiction's substantial purchasing
power ought to be struck down. For example, a city tax imposed on
Christmas trees purchased elsewhere and then brought within the
city's boundaries, which allegedly compete with the handful of
trees grown and sold within the city and subject to its sales tax, is
more likely to be a monopsonistic coordination of the city's
purchasing power than a measure designed to prevent taxpayers
from avoiding their responsibilities.
b.

Tolls and Taxes on Common Carriers

The interference-exploitation theme might at first glance appear
inconsistent with tolerant treatment of tolls. Tolls are most often

131

See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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charged for the use of bridges and other facilities that offer substantial opportunities for monopolistic exploitation. The development of a close substitute is normally a time-consuming undertaking requiring a large investment. Yet there is little reason to expect
that tolls would not survive judicial review.
Tolls seem more acceptable when viewed as exploitations that
are necessarily preceded by investments by the state. The analogy
to a patent, suggested earlier in the discussion of Zobel v. Williams,37 is helpful. From the standpoint of a state considering the
investment, a toll facility might most accurately be viewed as a single project, just as monopoly profits arising from a patent should
be considered from the perspective of an inventor deciding
whether to invest in research. In both cases, the prospect that the
exploitation phase of the "project-as-a-whole" will later be ruled
illegal may serve to deter the original investment. Toll facilities, in
this view, may be subsidies that expand rather than limit output.
Favorable judicial treatment is, therefore, no surprise. Tolls that
may fall more heavily on out-of-state users are, thus, similar to
higher tuitions charged to nonresident students who attend attractive state colleges that have been built and supported with state
funds. Of course, some state facilities may exploit strategic location
and entry barriers in a manner not essential to the creation of
these facilities. Judicial review of such schemes ought to be
available.
c. Excise Taxes
The Court's treatment of excise taxes is also consistent with the
interference-exploitation distinction. New York's disallowed transfer tax on securities 38 could have been used to exploit out-of-state
customers. 39 Similarly, Louisiana's tax on natural gas passing
through the state might have been struck down as potentially exploitative. 14 0 In each case the state enjoyed a unique advantage
protected, at least in the short run, from substitutes. On the other
hand, no state has more than the most fleeting monopoly on distri113See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
:3

39,

Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).

See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 127-

140 Maryland
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bution of the privilege to do business in corporate form. Judicial
approval of taxes on this privilege is, therefore, quite consistent
with the suggested theme.
The major excise tax case that does not "fit" is Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana,1 4 ' in which the Court upheld Montana's
facially nondiscriminatory severance tax on coal. Normatively, this
case is troubling and was probably wrongly decided. It can, with a
deep breath, be forced into the interference-exploitation scheme
using the "project-as-a-whole" argument outlined above.1 42 This
questionable exercise is left to the discussion of cases that, like
Commonwealth Edison, deal with the disposition of natural
4
resources.L 3
D. Other State Regulations Affecting Interstate Commerce
1.

Current Doctrines

The remaining cases concern state-imposed trade barriers that
do not fit into the categories already considered; these cases form
an unpredictable area of the law. In common-law fashion, the
Court has balanced local and national interests on a case-by-case
basis.14 4 Although commentators and dissenting justices have
shown increasing hostility toward the Court's approach to such
regulations, 4 5 there is no reason to criticize severely the Court's
methodology. Even though the balancing technique may be poor at
providing guidance to the lower courts, its unpredictable results after all are consistent with common-law jurisprudence;1 46 one would
hardly expect common-law tort or contract cases always to be de14 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
142

See supra text accompanying note 137.

Arguably, Montana's coal-in a world with recently cartelized oil-presented an opportunity to tax economic rent in a way that distorts allocative efficiency less than most other
taxes, which encourage substitution of untaxed goods. But if a state wishes to tax or confiscate rent that results from cartelization of substitutes, then it can just as easily impose a
windfall profits tax that does not reduce output in the way a tax on the product itself does.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 218-22.
144 For cases the Court itself cites for this proposition, see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
145 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Eule, supra note 8; Kitch, supra note 8.
1'
There is nothing wrong, of course, with case-by-case determinations in the common
law tradition. But the Court ought to clarify the nature of its intervention, and most importantly, ought to tell lower courts what to search for in the fact-finding process.
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cided for (or against) railroads or merchants.
One important group of cases might be dubbed the "transportation decisions" because they concern state regulations imposed on
interstate carriers. The Court has occasionally invalidated these
regulations, expressing skepticism about the safety or other local
benefits that they are said to generate. Thus, the Court has voided
regulations requiring nonconforming mudguards on trucks, 47 unusually strict length limitations on trucks 148 and trains,' 49 and dis-

ruptive speed limits on trains approaching road crossings. 50 The
Court, however, has not struck down all such "safety" regulation.
In South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,'5 ' for example, it accepted a regulation prohibiting trucks
wider than ninety inches and heavier than ten tons even though
these restrictions effectively banned the great majority of interstate trucks.
The Court has made similar case-by-case determinations outside
the transportation area, accepting some state restrictions on interstate trade while, invalidating others. For example, the Court upheld Detroit's smoke abatement standards in Huron Portland Cement v. City of Detroit,'52 despite their likely burden on interstate
commerce. The Court, however, has refused to accept claims that
health concerns justified restricting or barring sale of out-of-state
milk. 15 The Court has approached in similar fashion state regulathe
tions allegedly designed to assist consumers, and has balanced
54
commerce.1
interstate
on
burden
the
against
interest
state's
147
148

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Raymond Motor

Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
149 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
:0 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).'
"11303 U.S. 177 (1938).

152 362 U.S. 440 (1960). See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456

(1981) (upholding market regulation because of plausible environmental concern).
'51Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (refusing to accept Mississippi's health reasons for banning Louisiana milk); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951) (rejecting an ordinance blocking the sale of milk pasteurized more than five
miles away because less burdensome alternatives appeared available). See also Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (expressing skepticism regarding the connection between healthful sanitation and high profits that would result from price regulation of milk
bought out of state as well as in state).
154 See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(invalidating a North Carolina statute that kept competing apple crates from bearing more
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Although state interests in health and consumer protection
sometimes justify state regulation affecting interstate trade, the
Court is generally unsympathetic to explicit attempts to distort
prices and other market features. The Court, for example, struck
down a North Dakota statute allowing grain inspectors to determine the profit margin allowed on sales by grain dealers. 15 5 Similarly, the Court overturned an Arizona statute which had the ostensible purpose of enhancing the reputation of the state's produce
and the deleterious effect of requiring a fruit grower to spend a
quarter of a million dollars building a duplicative packing plant instate so that its containers would conform to state standards. 15 Of
course, if a state is serious about its anticompetitive goals, it can
enter an industry itself and drive prices or output in the preferred
direction. 157 Alternatively, the state can direct similar behavior by
information than required by U.S. Department of Agriculture standards, allegedly to protect
consumers from confusion of overinformation).
The Court, however, was not inclined to engage in such balancing in Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), which concerned a California prohibition on the importation of avocados with less than eight percent oil content. Competing
Florida avocados were of a different variety from California avocados and could not practically meet the California requirement. The Court remanded the case to the district court
because evidence relevant to commerce clause considerations had not been admitted at the
first trial. Id. at 156. The record, though, already contained far more evidence than the
Supreme Court has often had for its balancing work in this area. Compare FloridaLime &
Avocado, 373 U.S. at 140 (describing sources, relative oil content, storage features, and shipping qualities of avocados) with Washington Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-53 (describing barrier's
effect on relative marketing costs and advantages without any supporting empirical
evidence).
One argument that California might have made for its limitation on the import of competing avocados is that California contains a disproportionate share of the consumers of
avocados, perhaps in part because of investments by California growers in developing this
market, and that the growers should be assisted in keeping out free-riding competitors. This
form of protection seems quite extreme, however, when compared to, for example, the more
limited protection given ideas and inventions by the copyright laws. The notion underlying
this argument, that trade regulations should not be viewed in isolation but rather as the
second stage of desirable investments by a state, is at least plausible, however, and is the
same as the "project as a whole" theory discussed supra text accompanying note 137.
M Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922). See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (invalidating a New York statute stifling the entry and expansion of milk-receiving facilities that were pointedly described by a state commissioner as
threatening "destructive competition").
'" Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Apparently the Court is unsympathetic to market regulation affecting interstate commerce unless the effect is "incidental."
See Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 353 (1939) (upholding minimum price legislation and "distinguishing" Lemke).
'57 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
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private parties. In either case, the state can take refuge in the state
action exemption from the antitrust laws, first announced in
Parker v. Brown.15 8 This extreme and paradoxical treatment1 59 of
state regulation is discussed in Part IV of this article and is assumed not to affect the analysis of the cases discussed in this
section.
In sum, the Court's approach to state regulation is case-specific
and gives the lower courts little guidance in dealing with these uncategorized types of state action. This is perhaps best shown by
comparing the Court's different responses to two similar state regulations. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,6 0 the Court
upheld a statute prohibiting oil refiners from operating service stations in the state. Although the state's interest in regulating the
gasoline retail market was used to dispose of a substantive due
process argument,1 6 1 the Court's commerce clause analysis focused
on the lack of burden on interstate commerce. The Court emphasized that the statute did not discriminate against interstate sales
because out-of-state corporations that were not refiners could con16 2
tinue to sell gasoline in the state.
Two years later, in Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,163
the Court struck down a Florida law excluding out-of-state bank
holding companies from the state's capital markets. The Court's
opinion distinguished Exxon, claiming that Maryland's statute did
not discriminate between interstate and local producer-refiners,
whereas the Florida statute discriminated between out-of-state and
in-state bank holding companies. 1 " The distinction is unconvincing, given that Florida permitted out-of-state investment companies that were not bank holding companies, banks, or trust companies to compete in the Florida market. Both the Florida and
:88 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
59 It is paradoxical that minor state interference with commerce can be objectionable
while major involvement fits the Parker exemption. It is not paradoxical if one views the
"procedural" requirements of the Parker exemption, see Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for
"State Action" After Lafayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 437-38 (1981) (reviewing requirement

that state closely supervise regulation), as Congress' way of ensuring careful "agency" work
by the states.
100 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
:6t Id. at 124-25.
162 Id. at 125-26.
163 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
1" Id. at 42.
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Maryland statutes protected local businesses from a substantial set
of out-of-state competitors, and both permitted a small, less
threatening set of out-of-state enterprises to compete. The burden
on interstate commerce, therefore, is not obviously different, and
the local interest in controlling the gasoline market hardly seems
greater than the state's interest in controlling the market for financial services.' 6 5
2. Relevance of the Interference-ExploitationDistinction
Despite their limiting effect on economic activity, the great majority of these state-imposed barriers not involving subsidies, preferences, traditional quarantines, taxes, or tolls do not concern
unique, exploitable advantages. Thus, the now-familiar Mississippi
ban on Louisiana milk does not promote any monopolistic exploitation of out-of-state interests by Mississippi. Furthermore,
that ban is also unlikely to support a buying cartel, as a substantial
number of the potential customers for Louisiana milk live outside
Mississippi. Because the state actions involved in these cases generally lack clear exploitative potential, they are best classified as
interferences. Interestingly, the Court's balancing approach is in
fact similar to the judicial approach to interferences suggested
earlier.16 6
The proper approach to such cases is therefore the proposed judicial posture toward interferences. Courts might expect that Congress would object to many such barriers both because they are
inefficient and because they are slow to disappear (perhaps due to
the power of special interest groups in the legislating state's political process). Yet, courts might also expect an attentive Congress to
approve many other barriers imposed by the local regulatory proExxon and BT Investment might be viewed as reflecting the Court's sudden, or subtle,
process-orientation. The Court in BT Investment might have been motivated by its sense
that the statute was the result of lobbying by well-organized banking groups and inaction by
less organized and less informed consumers. Id. at 31. Presumably, the Court must also have
decided that, on balance, the statute yielded greater burdens than benefits. The decision in
Exxon may reflect the Court's sense that no intervention was necessary, rather than the
desirability of that statute over the one in BT Investment. As a factual matter, it is not
obvious that consumers in Exxon were better organized. Just as businesses may have lobbied against the major oil companies in Exxon, so too might they have lobbied in BT
Investment.
16' See supra text accompanying note 28.
165

HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev. 609 1983

610

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 69:563

cess, deferring to decisionmakers more familiar with local conditions. The same courts which are especially suspicious of state actions that are conceivably exploitative should be more hesitant to
invalidate barriers that are simply interferences. Nevertheless,
they should overturn some such barriers in common-law fashion
when they find that the benefits do not justify the costs. So long as
these judicial invalidations are based on commerce clause principles and not on less reversible constitutional grounds, Congress can
correct any judicial errors that might arise.
This approach does not imply that the courts are without guidance in deciding these regulation cases. In examining local regulations, courts should be more suspicious of those imposing substantial costs out-of-state than those placing costs primarily within the
legislating jurisdiction. Courts should also be concerned when formidable entry barriers make it particularly wasteful for out-ofstate businesses to adapt to a regulation: such barriers may facilitate exploitation, at least in the short run. Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.16 7 is a fine example of a case in which these concerns should
have been strong; there, the least expensive way around Arizona's
regulation was apparently to build a plant that unnecessarily duplicated one already in existence.
The reason for particular judicial scrutiny where a regulation imposes heavy costs out of state or results in significant economic
waste is not that such regulations are necessarily exploitative, but
rather that they seem most likely to impose costs on the nation
that cannot be justified by local interests. The transportation decisions"6 8 offer general examples. The Court has struck down statutes that, in the name of safety, place burdens on trucks and
trains. Although the advantageous location between population
centers of the states imposing these regulations cannot escape notice,""e the potential for exploitation in the monopolistic sense is
small; it is conceivable, but unlikely, that after requiring unique
:67 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See supra text accompanying note 156.
168
166

See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
The states included Arizona, Southern Pac. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Iowa, Kas-

sel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); South Carolina, South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); and Wisconsin, Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). All these states are situated in major hauling
streams, yet do not participate heavily in exports. They are therefore perfectly situated to
exploit carriers without causing great harm to themselves.
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mudguards on trucks, a state could use its locational advantage to
control the market for mudguards and extract a monopoly profit
from their sale. The more troublesome aspect of such a statute is,
instead, its striking disproportionality: a state may pass legislation
that yields relatively minor benefits to itself but imposes substantial burdens on nonresidents. Thus, many of the transportation decisions invalidating safety regulations would conform to the approach suggested in this article. 1 0 Of course, even some
interferences that impose their costs primarily out of state should
be upheld. A traditional quarantine might be an example. When
safety claims appear convincing and burdens on interstate commerce seem small, a reviewing court-and Congress itself-should
approve state regulations despite their disproportionate impact on
nonresidents.
In sum, interstate barriers should be inspected for exploitative
potential. But when no such potential is present, the Court's decisions are, for the most part, unsatisfactory only in the sense that
they do not articulate the nature of common-law review. Unless
the Court wishes to announce reliance on particular concerns such
as those just suggested, the lower courts can learn little from the
Court's decisions. The inability of states and other interested parties to predict the results in many regulation cases, however, is no
more troubling than the familiar inability to predict congressional
171
actions in this and other areas.

E. Natural Resources
Because the Supreme Court regards dispositions of natural resources as a special category of state actions affecting interstate
commerce, 17 2 this article does the same. The distinct treatment
"' See
171

supra text accompanying note 28.

Of course one difference between the two is that a court's unpredictable decision will

be retrospective while an unpredictable congressional decision is, at least technically, prospective in its impact. The unpredictability of judicial decisionmaking might therefore be
somewhat more troubling to some observers. My own skepticism regarding this traditional
distinction causes me to pass over its relationship to the nature and substance of judicial, or
agency, review discussed in this article.
172 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896), which had regarded states as owning the wild animals they contain, and
declaring that state regulations of such animals "should be considered according to the same
general rule applied to state regulation of other natural resources").
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that the Court continues to give the natural resource cases stems
from the traditional notion that a state owns natural resources
within its borders that are not privately controlled. Although modern decisions have made clear that such ownership can be no more
than an obsolete fiction, 1' " the category retains predictive value.
1. Current Doctrines
Supreme Court treatment of the natural resource cases reflects a
discernible theme; with a few exceptions, total bans on trade are
invalidated while less-than-impenetrable barriers are accepted
more readily than in cases not dealing with natural resources.
Thus, the Court has struck down the following state actions: a
city's ban on the exportation of water, 17 ' an Oklahoma ban on the
export of oil and gas,17 5 a Louisiana requirement that all shrimp
caught in its waters be shelled in-state,1 7 6 a similar South Carolina
statute requiring that all shrimp be processed in-state,17 7 an Alaska

law forbidding any work associated with Alaskan oil unless state
residents were preferred in hiring over nonresidents, " 8 a New
Hampshire law prohibiting the export of electric power until instate needs were satisfied, 9 and a West Virginia statute forbidding the export of gas unless all in-state demand had been met.180
Similarly, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,"8" the Court's invalidation of a
statute prohibiting the export of minnows "seined or procured
within the waters" of the state 82 also appears to fit the total-ban
theme. It might be argued that because the statute permitted the
'73 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S.

265, 284 (1977). For a discussion of the natural resources cases, see Hellerstein, Hughes v.
Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979

S. Ct. Rev. 51.
1,4 City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35
(1966). For a discussion of water embargoes, see Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The
Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 (1981).
175 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
176 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
177 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
178 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
179 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
ISOPennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Nothing in any of these cases
invalidating export restrictions appears to prevent a state from expending its own funds to
purchase all the available resource and then retaining the resource in-state.
1 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
182

Id. at 323.
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export of hatchery-bred minnows,18 3 it did not impose a total ban.
Such hatchery minnows are not a natural resource in the same
sense that natural minnows are, however, so that their different
treatment is not an exception to the total ban on the export of a
natural resource. In this sense, Hughes v. Oklahoma can scarcely
be regarded as a counterexample to the total-ban theme. 8
The Court, in contrast, has upheld less restrictive limitations including an Oklahoma tax on natural gas destined primarily for outof-state use, 185 a Montana severance tax on coal, 88 and a Montana
elk-hunting license fee charging nonresidents seven and one-half
times more than residents. 18 7 Significantly, these three restrictions
did not totally ban nonresidents from participating in economic activity, although they did impose substantial burdens.
The few exceptions to this approach are instructive. One may
view the Court's upholding in 1908 of a New Jersey ban on water
exportation, 18 and in 1876 of a Virginia statute prohibiting nonresidents from oystering in the state's tidewaters, 189 as "eroded
precedents." 9 0 The first,' 9 ' and perhaps the second, 9 ' of these
cases can also easily be reinterpreted using the interference-exploitation theme. For the present, however, it is useful to note that
neither statute was enacted to retaliate or reciprocate for another
state's barrier. In contrast, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,9 3 the Court
recently invalidated a restrictive water extraction and exportation
policy, emphasizing that under the Nebraska statute the grant of a
permit to export to another state was conditioned on that state's
offer of reciprocal water rights. 94 The Court's distaste for "reciproSee id. at 345 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" The Court's description of the statute indicates that it did not view this exception as
important. See id. at 323-24.
:85 Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
,:4 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
I7
1" Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3459-60 (1982); Hellerstein, supra note 173,
at 87.
19 See infra text accompanying note 210.
I'l See infra note 212.
1,3 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
I" It is the reciprocity requirement that fails to survive judicial scrutiny. Id. at 3465 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951)).
:83
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cal restrictions"
is, of course, not limited to the natural resource
195
cases.

More recent exceptions are distinguishable. The importance of
limestone deposits in Reeves, in which the Court sustained the
practice of selling cement to in-state customers exclusively, 196
might classify it as a natural resource case and a counterexample
to the total-ban approach. Arguably, however, the law did not completely ban exports because nonresidents could easily buy cement
from residents who bought the state's output. Alternatively, because the state owned the cement-producing facility, Reeves conceivably shows that subsidy cases form an exception to the totalban approach to natural resource restrictions.
In another apparent exception, Dayton Power & Light Co. v.
Lindley,197 an Ohio court invalidated on commerce clause grounds
a consumption tax inversely related to the sulphur content of coal.
Ohio's high-sulphur coal was, therefore, favored by the tax. The
tax hardly appears more objectionable than Montana's severance
tax on coal. 198 This invalidation of a less-than-total ban might be
distinguished on the ground that it was decided by a state court
detached from the Supreme Court's apparent, though unarticulated, approach to natural resource cases. This case can be rationalized, however, using the interference-exploitation theme. 199
The total-ban approach seemingly taken by the Court in natural
resource cases is a corollary to the sort of balancing that the Court
undertakes in reviewing state regulations in general. The Court
might see a total ban as a signal that the legislating state has not
considered less restrictive alternatives that, although less convenient to the state, 0 0 would be in the national interest. As noted earlier, the quarantine cases also reflect this approach; a broad quarantine is regarded more readily as an illegal intrusion on interstate
20 1
commerce than one with exceptions.

,93 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
16 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
"9 58 Ohio St. 2d 465, 391 N.E.2d 716 (1979).
1 Although one is paid by consumers and the other by producers, both are marginal
taxes and likely to yield similar effects.
,99 See text accompanying notes 212-16.
200 Once again, the state could struggle with user charges that would ensure nondiscrimination (and, perhaps, more sensible allocation of the resource).
201 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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However great the descriptive or predictive value of the totalban theme, standing alone it is an unsatisfactory judicial approach.
So long as states can selfishly block free trade by simply drafting
statutes that avoid imposing a total ban, they can easily undermine
the protection of free trade. If, for example, a cartel of states can
severely constrain the export of a mineral or grain-or tax the export to achieve the same result-in a way that is acceptable under
the total-ban approach, then the approach is ineffective. The different and unpredictable judicial treatment of similar interstate
barriers in natural resource cases, with emphasis on the form of
the barrier involved rather than the severity of its effect on free
trade, reflects the inadequacy of prevailing doctrines and methods.
2. Exploitative Potential of Natural Resource Restrictions
Truly total bans on the export of a natural resource cannot be
used for monopolistic exploitation; the resource is not sold at a
monopoly price to nonresidents, but is, instead, not sold at all. As
interferences, these total bans-like broad quarantines2 0 2-appear
to arouse fears that the state is regulating with an unnecessarily
broad brush only because a substantial share of the burdens produced by the barrier fall out of state.
In reality, however, some of the bans treated by the Court as
total are not complete bans and therefore do have exploitative potential. For example, a requirement that all shrimp caught in state
waters be shelled in-state 0 3 presents the obvious danger of cartelization by the state's shelling industry. Oklahoma's prohibition on
the export of minnows, coupled with an exception for those bred in
hatcheries, also contains exploitative potential; its invalidation by
the Court 20 4 therefore seems consistent with the approach suggested in this article. More importantly, statutes 20 5 that prohibit
export of a good until after satisfaction of "all" in-state needs may
tend to limit exports to monopoly levels. To the extent that nonresidents will find it expensive to shift to other suppliers, exploitation can succeed.
Application of the interference-exploitation theme is often con"
:03

See supra note 80.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.

04 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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sistent with the Court's more charitable view of less-than-total
bans in natural resource cases. As noted in the discussion of subsidies earlier in this article, the in-state preference in sales of cement
in Reeves 06 clearly lacks exploitative potential. It was, instead, an
output-expanding interference that the state had "consciously
funded."
The discriminatory hunting license fee schedule in Baldwin v.
Fish and Game Commission20 7 provides a more striking case because the Court upheld a scheme in which the state openly
adopted tactics that are easily viewed as monopolistic.

20 8

Yet, it is

a decision that grows on the student of interstate barriers. Is it not
possible that Montana's elks have survived as the result of state
expenditures, or because the state has forgone development and
accompanying tax revenues? Thus, the state law at issue seems to
resemble both discriminatory state university tuition schedules
and some state-constructed toll facilities that do not exploit nonresidents but rather offer them a windfall. To the extent that a
state employs user license fees, residents pay lower user charges
than nonresidents because residents have already contributed to
the project through their state's tax system. Perhaps many barriers
to the use of a state's natural resources stem from such "public
goods" decisions; the state supports a conservation scheme with
general revenues rather than financing it through administratively
inconvenient user charges alone. In this view, some natural resource cases-like other "projects-as-a-whole" discussed earlier 209 -come to the courts as tax or regulation cases but are really
subsidy cases and not at all exploitative.
Interestingly enough, some early validations of total bans, which
have been described above as "eroded precedents,

'210

can be rein-

terpreted as belonging to this set of "public good" cases. State expenditures or deliberate restraints on economic development may
:o See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
207 436 U.S. 371 (1978). See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
208 The case, of course, could be distinguished as a privileges and immunities decision
dealing with pure recreation and not "commerce" at all. But the discussion continues to
develop the interference-exploitation theme without reference to the traditional reach of
particular constitutional phrases and doctrines.
209 See supra text accompanying note 137.
2'0 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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have made water plentiful in New Jersey in 1908.211 The state
might not have continued these expenditures or restraints if the
Court had not permitted the state to control use of water by
nonresidents.
Not all natural resource cases fit this sympathetic mode, however.2 12 The Ohio coal-consumption tax at issue in Dayton Power
& Light2 1 s does not appear ?a have been part of a state project to
create or protect a public good. Because the tax was inversely related to the sulphur content of coal, it favored local coal over
cleaner low-sulphur coal found in competitor states. The decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court to invalidate the tax therefore seems
clearly correct. ,14 Moreover, to the extent that judicial intervention
in these cases is justified because it anticipates Congress' response
and therefore conserves legislative resources, the case is correctly
decided, in light of the federal environmental policy of discouraging sulphur oxide emissions.2 1 5 The area might, in fact, be regarded
as quasi-preempted; if, contrary to Ohio in Dayton Power & Light,
a state were to enact a consumption tax positively related to
sulphur content, the courts probably would uphold it, even though
it imposed a barrier on interstate commerce. Such a tax would
seem in harmony with congressional actions; it might also be part
of a "public good" project to promote cleaner air.21 8
The analytic tension in Commonwealth Edison is now apparent.21 On the one hand, the Montana coal severance tax involved
seems clearly exploitative. As a normative matter, the case there"'

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
For example, the other "eroded precedent," McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876),

is not rescued with a reinterpretation unless Virginia somehow invested in the maintenance
of oyster beds, which seems extremely unlikely in the 1870's.
"1358 Ohio St. 2d 465, 466, 391 N.E.2d 716, 717 (1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 197-99.
2'4 As a descriptive matter, the statute's invalidation is probably better understood as the
product of a very tough state supreme court. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 56 Ohio St. 2d 334, 383 N.E.2d 1163 (1978) (invalidating on commerce clause
grounds a statute that required a public utility to secure the approval of a state regulatory
commission before issuing securities of maturity greater than one year).
11 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1971) (setting national primary ambient air quality standards for sulphur oxides).
2"6 Note the potential conflict between quasi-preemption and conscious-funding. If the
state expended its own funds to favor dirty coal, presumably the reviewing court should first

consider the clarity of Congress' instructions.
217 See supra notes 18-22, 186 and accompanying text.
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fore seems wrongly decided. The coincidental enactment of similar
taxes in neighboring coal-producing states21 raised a barrier to
substituting other coal sources to avoid Montana's monopoly price.
The exploitation thus permitted by the Court's decision is the
most harmful sort of state action involved in the commerce clause
cases. If the reason that the tax has escaped invalidation is that it
involves a natural resource but is not a total ban, then the inadequacy of the prevailing doctrines in the natural resource cases is
simply made clearer. 19
On the other hand, Montana's coal tax could be viewed as one
part of a nonexploitative "public good" project. Without a severance tax, the state legislature might limit all mining operations for
conservation reasons, yielding higher energy prices to nonresidents
than those that result from the tax. Perhaps there are state subsidies for mining research that would cease if the severance tax were
not permitted.220
Nonetheless, these arguments seem somewhat implausible, given
the opportunistic timing of Montana's tax,221 and to entertain the

project-as-a-whole argument in these circumstances may tempt exploitative states to create paper records supporting claims of conservation efforts. Yet, a rule of thumb approach that accepts barriers concerning natural resources more readily than similar barriers
in other contexts seems reasonable; in natural resource cases, project-as-a-whole arguments are generally more plausible than they
are in cases involving stock exchanges, fruit growing industries,
highways, or railroads.2 2
28 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 640 & n.5 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
2'9 See supra text accompanying note 201.
220 Note that Smith v. Department of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981), and supra text accompanying notes 45-50, remains a difficult
case. To the extent that the state's subsidy of the marketplace enabled it to operate, that
"project as a whole" is clearly nonexploitative. The interference-exploitation theme simply
does not resolve the Court's inquiry in one step, but rather focuses the factfinding process.
'21 The tax was raised considerably in 1975 following the Arab oil embargo. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 639 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 An interesting "project as a whole" argument can be made with regard to a locality's
zoning statutes. The relevance of zoning to interstate commerce has been recognized. Regulation, Federalism, and Interstate Commerce 135-36 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981). Clearly, zoning
can be viewed as an attempt by residents to exploit newcomers. On the other hand, zoning
can efficiently place polluters near one another and can encourage efficiencies in transportation and labor markets. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
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A Final Application: Corporate Takeover Statutes

Edgar v. MITE and Interstate Exploitation

In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,2 the Supreme Court recently invalidated on commerce clause grounds a state statute regulating corporate acquisitions. Such statutes present the danger of interstate
exploitation, and the Court's decision therefore is in harmony with
the approach suggested in this article. The treatment of corporate
takeover statutes in MITE departs from the general judicial tolerance for other state securities regulation laws. Generally, lack of
exploitative potential and implicit approval by Congress justifies
judicial acceptance of these blue-sky laws.
a. The MITE Decision
The relationship between federal and state regulatory schemes
best explains the judicial response to state securities laws in general and the MITE decision in particular. Federal law regulates the
issue and sale of securities. Individual states also regulate such
transactions and no doubt interfere with interstate trade. But commerce clause challenges to these state blue-sky laws have failed
both because the courts have viewed blue-sky laws as only regulating in-state transactions-an unsatisfying rationale 24-and because Congress has implicitly and explicitly approved the coexistence of state and federal regulatory schemes.2 25
Parallel federal and state schemes also regulate corporate takeovers. In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act,22 6 which imposes
informational and substantive requirements on cash tender offers.
Some states have also passed "takeover statutes" which impose
constraints on tender offers and generally give state officials the
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973) (finding zoning in need of
substantial curtailment or replacement with other means). Although the subject is beyond
the immediate reach of this article, alternatives to zoning, such as nuisance laws, could also
run into commerce clause principles unless the "project as a whole" is viewed as nonexploitative or otherwise not inconsistent with the wishes of Congress.
22. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
" This view is as unsatisfying as the Parkerv. Brown concept. See infra text accompanying note 257-59.
'25 See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1329 (5th ed.
1980).
22' Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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power to delay an acquisition and to evaluate its treatment of interested parties.2 27
There is less reason to think that Congress would approve of coexistent federal and state regulation of corporate takeovers than of
securities issue and sale. Unlike the Securities Act of 1933, which
was passed years after state blue-sky laws were common, the Williams Act was passed when only one state had a takeover statute-and that statute was only a few months old. Congress therefore cannot be said to have approved the takeover laws
subsequently enacted in more than two-thirds of the states.228 Additionally-and this argument was decisive in MITE229-the policies of the Williams Act are different from those of state takeover
statutes. The Williams Act can be reasonably viewed as showing
Congress' wish to be neutral between the target corporation's management and the takeover bidder in a battle for control. State
takeover laws, in contrast, generally favor the target's management
by putting constraints only on bidders. 2- 0 As an implementation of
congressional policy, the Court's invalidation of the Illinois statute
in MITE therefore seems reasonably sound.
The MITE decision is based on the negative commerce clause as
well as on preemption by federal securities law. 231 The Court's
commerce clause discussion-alas, separated from the preemption
discussion-is latently provocative and deserves special attention.
The decision focuses on the effects of the Illinois statute outside
the state. The law applied to a takeover if ten percent of a target's
shareholders were Illinois residents or if any two of the following
three conditions were met: (1) the target had its principal office in
Illinois, (2) it was organized under Illinois laws, or (3) it had at
least ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in-state.

227 The Illinois act involved in Edgar v. MITE directed the state official to deny registration to a tender offer if it "would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the offerees."
102 S. Ct. at 2633. For reviews of some of the state statutes and discussions of their coexistence with the Williams Act, see Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1976); Note, Securities Law and
the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 Yale L.J. 510 (1979).

228
229

Note, supra note 227, at 514.

This argument clearly motivated the Court's invalidation of the Illinois statute in
MITE. 102 S. Ct. at 2636-37, 2639.
220 For example, the Illinois statute permitted the target company to communicate with
its shareholders while the bidder was to remain silent. Id. at 2637.
231 Id. at 2640-43.
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The Court concluded:
Thus the Act could be applied to regulate a tender offer which
would not affect a single Illinois shareholder.
It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such regulations,
so may other states; and interstate commerce in securities transac232
tions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled.
Later in the opinion,233 the Court emphasized this concern with
potentially overlapping state schemes by distinguishing a state's
regulation of the "internal affairs of a corporation incorporated
under its laws" from the Illinois statute. The Court argued that the
former generates no overlap and ensures that a corporation will
not face conflicting state demands. The decision is thus reminiscent of the tax cases in which the Court has disfavored overlapping, or duplicative, schemes. 3
If MITE does no more than invalidate overlapping state
schemes, then it is rather straightforward but of limited importance as precedent, for the many state takeover laws are by no
means identical. Some generate very little "direct" interference
with interstate commerce because no more than one state can
claim jurisdiction. For example, a statute might define the target
company as one that was incorporated in the state and had its
principal place of business there.23 5 In comparison, if all states cop'" Id. at 2641.

Id. at 2642-43.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
235 If a state's takeover statute applies only when target companies are incorporated in
the state and have their principal place of business in-state, then, at most, only one state's
statute would apply to any one target company. Connecticut, Hawaii, and Indiana define
the target company in their statutes in this manner. Of course, a statute that defines a
target only as one incorporated in the state is also not overlapping. Maryland and Virginia
have what are, essentially, such statutes.
Takeover statutes often define the target as incorporated in the state or having its principal place of business in the state. If every state had such a statute, then two states' laws
would often apply to a takeover because many enterprises are incorporated in a state other
than where their principal place of business is located. Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have essentially this
"overlap" definition of targets.
Finally, another common target company definition is one incorporated in the state or
having its principal place of business there or maintaining significant assets there. If
adopted by all states, this definition would lead to more than two statutes applying because
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ied the Illinois statute, the number of states imposing conflicting
demands on a corporate acquisition could be one, two or more, or
zero (zero if no state contained at least two of the three requisites
for assets, principal office, or place of incorporation). In short, Edconsume the other
gar v. MITE does not by its terms or23reasoning
6
effect.
in
still
statutes
state takeover
b.

Takeover Statutes and Interstate Exploitation

The Court's continuing acceptance of state blue-sky laws contrasted with its invalidation of the Illinois takeover statute neatly
reflects the interference-exploitation theme. State blue-sky laws
regulating the initial issue of securities seem to lack exploitative
potential. Admittedly, if a business wishes to get underway or expand by combining the capital of many investors, its interstate efforts might be hampered by a state regulatory scheme that imposes requirements in addition to those of the federal securities
law. But the enterprise could avoid the state scheme by finding
investors in other states. 3 7 The regulatory scheme would lack exploitative potential unless, of course, a single state contained investors with a large share of available capital.
But what if an enterprise already exists and an "outsider" seeks
to acquire it, perhaps because the outsider can guide it to greater
profits through innovation, better management, or profitable synergistic combination with a different business? Such a potential
purchaser might be unwilling to proceed without a large share of
the ownership, for the presence of other owners will dilute the rewards to the acquirer's talents, ideas, or previous efforts. This innovative entrepreneur might be relegated to less efficient alternatives such as starting the business from scratch, buying another
many corporations have substantial assets in a great many states. This definition has been
adopted in Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Utah.
238 But courts that have reviewed state takeover statutes after Edgar v. MITE have not
focused on the "relative overlap" of the various statutes. See Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marrietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (invalidating Maryland statute that contained
no "overlap"); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 547 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1982) (striking down
Virginia statute generating no overlap and focusing on level of contact with in-state shareholders). But see Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding
Edgar v. MITE not clearly dispositive-with respect to a statute potentially overlapping
that of one other state-and remanding for balancing of burdens and benefits).
237 Of course, some of the burden of the regulatory scheme is borne by potential in-state
investors who will lose opportunities to join a capital-pooling enterprise.
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company, or bargaining for the direct sale of assets. 3 8
The undesirable effects of such a takeover statute do not arise
merely when out-of-state buyers enter the market. Even if a state's
takeover statute blocks only offers to its own residents, potential
sellers may use it to earn "holdout" profits, thereby stifling innovation and commerce to a greater extent than any blue-sky law. A
business faced with a restrictive blue-sky law can go to other states
to raise capital, but when it seeks control of another business, the
shares that it needs are already distributed so that one state's restriction may forestall the purchase of the necessary fraction of total ownership. The acquirer or innovator cannot simply go elsewhere to buy the shares that it needs. The relative exploitative
potential of takeover statutes thus distinguishes them from bluesky laws. The welfare loss imposed on the nation by this type of
exploitation is the loss of the innovation or other benefits that may
flow from a change in corporate ownership. Overlapping takeover
statutes are, of course, still worse because they expand the number
of states that can exploit a single business.
The exploitative potential of this holdout power is difficult to
realize in this direct sense, however, because the Williams Act prevents payment of different prices to different sellers.' Nevertheless, the legislating state may still be able to use a takeover law for
exploitative purposes by restricting the exit of assets or employment opportunities from the state. This characterization of a state
takeover law as a substitute for direct exit barriers offers a useful
restatement of the differences in exploitative potential between
takeover statutes and the blue-sky laws. While the former may be
part of a scheme to block the exit of existing assets, blue-sky laws
cannot have such effect. By preventing the movement of these resources, the state can protect its ability to exploit them through
taxation and other methods. In other words, the state can use a
takeover law to protect its monopoly on the current location of assets. If the state succeeds in obstructing their migration, an innovator faces the substantial barrier of recreating the assets elsewhere. Takeover statutes are particularly attractive to states intent
238 See Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev.
771, 838 (1982).
131 All sellers (regardless of home state) will receive the same price so that the holdout
state treats nonresidents exactly as it does residents.
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on hoarding these resources because unfriendly corporate acquisitions increase the probability that the business will be moved and
because use of a more direct "exit-obstacle" to movement of assets
or job opportunities would be unacceptable to the courts.2 40 It
comes as no surprise that states occasionally admit to exit-obstacle
intentions.2 41
2. Implications of MITE for State CorporateLaw
No case or commentator seems to notice the rather startling potential for commerce clause claims in corporate law after MITE.
The Court insisted that its decision did not affect the state interest
in regulating internal corporate affairs because "[t]ender offers
contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company. '242 But this statement either papers over or misunderstands
many aspects of corporate law. In fact, there is no clear line between "internal affairs" and the commerce clause concerns underlying MITE. It is also difficult to see a difference in the exploitative potential in the two areas of law.
240 See Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1158 (1974); Note, supra note 227, at 528.
An exploiting state might agree with a surprising comment in a concurrence to Edgar v.
MITE:
Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional personnel experienced
in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This
disparity in resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional target
corporation. Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general
public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and State.*
[* The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations
tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the
State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management personnel-many of whom have provided community leadership-may
move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.]
102 S.Ct. at 2643 (Powell, J., concurring).
241 See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (D.N.J. 1981) (noting state
official's concern regarding the closing of target's in-state plants).
It is difficult to imagine such comments and concerns with respect to the analogous, if not
identical, possibility of a state's imposing an exit tax on persons rather than enterprises. See
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
242 102 S.Ct. at 2643.
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Consider, for example, the law regarding "sale of control," an
area that is much less settled in both theory and practice than
some commentators care to admit.2 43 In the classic case,244 a small
shareholder sues for a pro-rata share of the premium above "market" price received by the seller of a controlling bloc of shares. If a
state court or legislature sympathizes with such small shareholders
and adopts an "equal opportunity rule," does not MITE raise the
possibility that the defendant will appeal to commerce clause prin-

ciples in arguing that the state rule will make interstate acquisitions more expensive and therefore less likely?2 4 5 Whole portions
of the opinions in MITE are directly transferable to cases regarding sale of control.
Similarly, other "internal affairs" of the corporation may involve

the commerce clause concerns expressed in MITE. Examples include any rules that affect the potential for speedy interstate acquisitions: shareholder voting rights, supermajority voting requirements, proxy regulation, restrictions on share transferability,
compensation schemes that tend to "lock in" management, regula-

tions affecting corporate combinations, and, most interestingly,
state remedies with respect to insider trading that exceed those
provided under federal laws.246
A reasonable but not entirely satisfying response to the preceding argument draws on the importance of the preemption ground
143 The discussion in the text includes both "equal opportunity" claims and frozen-out
(dissenting) minority shareholders' claims as part of the sale-of-control area. See Levmore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. (1983);
Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979) (sympathizing with frozen-out shareholder in what was essentially a "going private" transaction and reviewing cases on treatment of frozen-out shareholders).
244 See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). For conceivable precedents for
an "equal opportunity rule," see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464,
81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975) (requiring some sharing in a very close corporation setting).
15 For example, it is arguable that, on commerce clause grounds, state-imposed fiduciary
obligations with respect to a target's repurchase of shares ought to be no more flexible than
the state's treatment of bidders.
2,6 State corporate law might discourage an acquirer who will fear that after an unsuccessful takeover attempt, disposition of the target's stock will be objectionable and therefore
expensive. Any such state law, whether statutory or judge-made, might be objected to on, as
the text goes on to describe, quasi-preemption grounds; the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the securities acts in a way that is unsympathetic to such a relatively uninformed "insider" might be taken as the final word. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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for the MITE decision. MITE could be regarded as addressing
only state statutes that are quasi-preempted because an expression
of congressional intent-the Williams Act-operates nearby. Most
2 47
state corporation law, in contrast, has little federal law nearby.
Therefore, the response might run, state regulation of internal corporate affairs is entitled to more leeway.
This response would be more convincing if it could build on the
differing vulnerability to retaliation of interferences and exploitations. Thus it would be tempting to suggest that sale-of-control law
lacks the exploitative potential of takeover statutes, because other
states can retaliate more easily. While Montana's out-of-state coal
customers, for example, cannot seriously threaten retaliatory action, many states could enact counteracting sale-of-control laws.
Additionally, sale-of-control law has minimal exploitative potential
because corporations can easily make paper migrations, reincorporating in less restrictive states.
Both of these suggestions are helpful, but do not entirely distinguish Edgar v. MITE. States can also retaliate against the enactment of takeover statutes with similar laws of their own. Also, contrary to the suggested view of MITE as dealing only with the
danger of overlapping takeover laws, the case does not suggest that
states can inhibit acquisitions so long as jurisdiction is based solely
on the target company's state of incorporation. This failure does
not mean that the Court should not be explicit about the desirability of nonoverlapping-and, therefore, not as easily exploitative-jurisdictional claims, but there is simply no such explication
in the Court's opinion. In any event, there is no escape-nor
should there be-from the notion that state corporation law can
run into commerce clause principles.
IV.

RETHINKING THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION IN ANTITRUST
248
LAW

An historical impediment to complete acceptance of the interfer247 Under this view, when there is federal law "nearby," as in the case of insider trading
regulation, more restrictive state law may be troubling (if potentially interfering with interstate commerce).
24s After my own "rethinking" (and a much longer draft of this Part), I was fortunate to
read Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & Econ. 23 (1983).
As I indicate in the text, my own views on the state action exemption in antitrust law are
much like Professor Easterbrook's-who shares (at least in the antitrust framework) my
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ence-exploitation approach is the famous decision of Parker v.
Brown,4 9 in which the Court is understood to have exempted monopolies controlled by state governments from the antitrust
laws. 250 The Parker doctrine clearly does permit a variety of exploitative maneuvers by states. The original case involved statedirected price-fixing among raisin growers who produced nearly all
domestic raisins and fifty percent of the world's raisin crop.2 5 1
Therefore, if Parker'sformulation of the state action exemption is
applied, there is little room to examine a state's exploitation under
commerce clause principles, because Parkerv. Brown itself consid25 2
ered and essentially rejected the commerce clause argument.
My own view is similar to that of Professor Easterbrook: the
state action exemption should be reformulated to exclude circumstances ripe for interstate exploitation.25 " The doctrine, for example, should exempt typical state regulation of a local electric utility
but should not protect regulation that "exports" monopoly burdens to nonresidents. 54 The courts should allow the latter type of
regulation, like other exploitations, only where Congress has indicated specific approval.
The result in Parker itself is not inconsistent with such a reformulation; the problem is rather with later cases that have followed
it with little thought. Clearly, Congress can permit interstate exploitation if it chooses; the interference-exploitation distinction

concern for "exploitation." As such, the discussion in this Part describes the relationship

between the exemption and the other themes explored in this article and does not rehearse
the dangers of exploitation unchecked by the antitrust laws.
:49 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

"lO See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
435 (1981) (reviewing recent decisions and suggesting that antitrust liability not be expanded to control anticompetitive practices by states); Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as
a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 Duke L.J. 389 (interpreting the state action exemption as a manifestation of both the states' eleventh amendment sovereign immunity and tenth amendment
reserved powers); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. Rev.
1099 (1981) (arguing against a requirement that states "supervise" their anticompetitive
schemes); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parkerv. Brown,
75 Colum. L. Rev. 328 (1975) (doubting that review of state regulatory schemes with antitrust tools would fare better than substantive review under the due process clause).
251 317 U.S. at 345.
251 Id. at 359-68.

,SS See supra note 248.
''

See supra note 22.
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builds on the notion that courts should apply sound economic policies only in the absence of explicit congressional direction. In
Parkersuch direction may have been present: the California legislation at issue was so similar to existing federal agricultural policies that the Court might reasonably have believed that Congress
would have approved California's scheme despite its exploitative
potential.255 Moreover, officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had collaborated in drafting the state's raisin program.2 58 The
Court could easily have believed that the area was "quasi-preempted" and that the judicial role was to implement congressional
policy by upholding the state's scheme, no matter how exploitative.
One could read Parker, therefore, as allowing state-created exploitations only where they seem consistent with explicit congressional policy.
Parker,however, has not been read this way because the Parker
Court illogically separated the preemption and commerce clause
discussions in its opinion. The opinion first uses the relationship
between the state and federal programs to dispense with the preemption argument; 257 it then avoids the reach of the negative commerce clause by insisting that the state action affected the raisins
before they entered the stream of interstate commerce. 5 8 Instead,
the Court should have combined the two issues into one argument:
not only was the state statute not preempted by any federal law,
but also the two were so similar as to show congressional approval
of-and therefore no commerce clause objection to-California's
action. 259 This suggested reformulation of the state action exemption to exclude exploitation in general would not, of course, stand
in the way of any congressional decisions to permit particular state
exploitations.
The reformulation of the state action exemption to establish the
relative dominance of commerce clause principles may be especially important if state "subsidies" are regularly approved-either

258

317 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 361.

250

At the end of its commerce clause discussion, the Court does combine preemption and

255
2"
257

commerce clause arguments by noting that whatever effect the California program had on
interstate commerce, "it is one which it has been the policy of Congress to aid and encourage." Id. at 368.
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under current doctrine or under the suggested interference-exploitation approach. As noted in the discussion of Zobel v. Williams earlier, 60 a state might use a subsidy to accumulate a resource, and then at some later time enjoy monopoly power. " '
Some accumulation-exploitation schemes may be tolerated as necessary to encourage innovation and risk-taking; but other such
schemes do not produce these benefits, 2 ' and judicial efforts to
invalidate them should not be blocked by unthinking reliance on
Parker v. Brown.
V.

CONCLUSION

The potential for monopolistic exploitation is an important
theme in the vast number of cases concerning interstate economic
tensions. As a purely descriptive matter, the interference-exploitation theme is quite successful in broad terms-as, for example, in
110See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
211One possible illustration concerns airports. Conceivably an airport can be built that
will deter new entrants and charge monopolistic user fees or taxes that are borne in large
part by travelers from other jurisdictions. Alternatively, the exploitative taxes could be levied through airport restaurant charges or taxicab fares. In the only Supreme Court case in
this area, Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972),
a statute charging one dollar to each commercial passenger was upheld. The Court again
placed the burden of proof of discrimination on the "taxpayer." See supra text accompanying note 102.
Two state courts, though, have invalidated airport taxes having some exploitative potential. In Allegheny Airlines v. Sills, 110 N.J. Super. 54, 264 A.2d 268 (1970), the invalidated
service charge applied only to airports within a municipality of 100,000 or more in population. Inasmuch as the tax appears only to have applied in the Newark airport, servicing
many travelers to and from nearby New York City who might find it more convenient than
alternatives, the case seems well-decided because the tax's potential for exploitation is clear.
Moreover, the multistate Port Authority helped develop the airport, so that a "project as a
whole" argument is unconvincing. A tax on commercial passengers whose travels originate at
the jurisdiction's airport was also invalidated in Northwest Airlines v. Joint City-County
Airport Bd., 154 Mont. 352, 463 P.2d 470 (1970). If many users were from surrounding counties, then the exploitative potential of the tax is clear. In short, although these cases cite the
"right to travel" precedents of Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (invalidating statute forbidding interstate transportation of indigents on commerce clause grounds) and
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867) (invalidating tax on interstate passengers), they comfortably fit within the interference-exploitation framework.
Finally, with respect to airport exploitation through levies on related activities, compare
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (supporting
state's legislative policy involving limits on car rental companies) with Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (denying existence of cities' authority to
award monopoly taxicab franchise at airport).
," See supra note 222 and text accompanying notes 219-22.
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portraying the different judicial treatment of subsidy and tax
cases-and somewhat successful in rationalizing individual cases.
The theme also has the practical value of clarifying the economic
stakes involved in particular state actions. An appreciation by
courts of the potential for exploitation in state actions affecting
interstate trade should help focus attention on relevant facts and
structural relationships rather than on doctrinal recitation.
With a project as long and broad-brush as this one, it is perhaps
best to conclude by pointing out some themes that have not been
considered. First, there is a haunting analogy between limitations
and subsidies on the one hand and "rights and privileges" on the
other.26 The state's ability to spend in discriminatory interstate
fashion and its inability to tax similarly is not unlike the state's
ability to distribute vast fortunes in somewhat unequal ways and
its sometime inability to take away relatively small benefits without substantial safeguards. At the heart of both these distinctions
is the preservation of the status quo. Surely this is a rich area for
further inspection, but the distinction seems to have limited use in
considering the cases that deal with interstate economic issues.
Most subsidies are financed by taxes and thus are likely to disturb
the inherited wealth distribution at the very start. So the rightsprivileges notion, whatever its descriptive value in other contexts,
can hardly provide a satisfying basis for understanding the different treatments accorded taxes and subsidies. The interference-exploitation theme, in contrast, does provide such a basis.
The discussion has also all but ignored both traditional constitutional doctrines and the intricacies of the positions taken by individual justices over time. The article is about "commerce clause"
principles in a generic sense-be they derived from the commerce
clause in section 8 of article I, the privileges and immunities clause
in section 2 of article IV, the equal protection clause (or, for that
matter, the privileges and immunities phrase) of the fourteenth
amendment, the right to travel, or the structure of the Constitution taken as a whole. As noted several times above, the approach
this article suggests is more convincing and complete if these principles are derived in such a way that leaves judicial determinations
subject to later congressional review. But the interference-exploita263 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
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tion theme surely retains vitality even for those who are uncomfortable with viewing the Court's role in this area as developing
constitutional common law or for those who, convinced that the
cases must mean what they say, are tied to specific constitutional
provisions independent of congressional or judicial common law
decisionmaking.
Acknowledgment that this article leaves these subjects unexplored is meant to emphasize that my purpose has been to develop
only one perspective on the commerce clause cases. Together with
other possible perspectives, it may form a richer and more coherent picture of the many concerns that run through this area of the
law.

HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev. 631 1983

HeinOnline -- 69 Va. L. Rev. 632 1983

